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Army killer squads spread terror in the cities 
General Benny Murdani, Commander of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces and commander of the army's security command, 
KOPKAMTIB, has publicly acknowledged that the security 
forces are responsible for hundreds of killings that have occurred 
recently in many Indonesian cities. He made it perfectly clear, 
after a coordination meeting to discuss policy held in Jakarta at 
the end of June, that the security forces are engaged in a nation-
wide operation 'to combat crime'. 
The operations have led to a curtailment in the areas of 
operation available to street gangs, he said. It is possible therefore 
that some of the deaths that have occurred may be the result of 
inter-gang rivalries. As if expecting not to be believed, he added: 
"I'm not making this up, you know". 
More than three hundred are known to have died as a result of 
the activities of the death squads. Bandung leads with more than 
120 victims, then Central Java with 70, Jogjakarta with 60 and 
Jakarta with 55. Murdani pointed out however that the actual 
number of victims is certainly much higher than this because the 
figures given only account for those victims whose bodies have 
been taken to hospitals for autopsies. 
Reporting Murdani's statement, Tempo says that many victims 
are known to have disappeared without trace. In Jogjakarta for 
instance, bodies are known to have been dumped in wells leading 
to tunnels that go out to the ocean. 
Sources: Topik, 5th July, and Tempo, 2nd July, 1983. 
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Yap Thiam Hien: 
GO AHEAD AND SHOOT 20 MILLION 
"Perhaps I should suggest, as a way to make our country 
secure, that all the twenty million poor people should be 
murdered," said Yiap Thiam Hien, a lawyer, speaking at a 
seminar held in May to discuss the death squads. He 
referred earlier to the theologian, Bishop D. McDonald 
Tamara, who has written that poverty is a cause of violence 
and crime. 
Mr. Yap recalled a statement made recently by Ali Said, 
Minister of Justice, that it is better to shoot a hundred 
criminals in order to protect the safety of a hundred 
thousand other citizens. 
"I'm surely not the only one who was upset to hear such a 
statement, coming from a minister, a jurist who is in charge 
of legal affairs. It not only conflicts with the Pancasila, the 
law on the Judiciary and the Criminal Procedural Code. It is 
also diametrically opposed to the oath of office taken by all 
government officials, not to infringe the Pancasila or the 
1945 Constitution." 
KEONG 
Death squads in action 
* The body of Giot (18 years) was found on 4th May by the 
roadside; there were two bullet wounds in the head which had also 
been struck by two heavy blows . Giot worked at Kramat Jati 
Market , his brother said. The night before he was found dead, he 
was dragged away from the Hawaii Bar in Cisalak, on the 
outskirts of Jakarta , by five men , four of them armed with pistols. 
"He was shot dead while being driven in a vehicle to Cibubur," 
said one official. "He must have been trying to resist." (Tempo, 21 
May, 1983) 
* On 11th May at around 8.30pm, the body of Joko Sulisnowas 
found in Aldiron Plaza Shopping Arcade , Kebayoran Baru, 
Jakarta. He had been shot twice in the chest. An hour later, the 
body of Baginda Siregar was found near the Blok M bus terminal, 
also in Kebayoran Baru. He had been shot through the head . The 
bodies of two other men, also with gunshot wounds, were found in 
other parts of South Jakarta on the same night . (Tempo, 21 May 
1983) 
* Bodies of known criminals with bullet wounds have been 
discovered in many places . In Indramayu, Purwakarta and 
Cianjur, bodies have been found hidden in sacks . .. On one night 
alone, four bodies were found in sacks under Kalianyur Bridge in 
Indramayu. (Tempo, 4 June 1983) 
* At a discussion forum about the recent wave of deaths, held 
at the LBH office in Jakarta, forensic expert Dr. Abdul Mun'in 
said: "The bodies have generally been shot at close range, from a 
LE1.l'ERS TO THE EDITOR 
Killings in Java 
For reasons unknown to me, ma-
jor news organizations are not 
printing the full story about what is 
happening in Indonesia. Recent 
ress reports said that 400 people 
been mysteriously killed in In-
CJ') onesia, and the commander of the 
...-l ed forces was quoted as saying 
t might be the work of rival gangs. ro · of this is misleading. 
...-l The fact is that the military itself 
solely responsible for these kill-
..; gs. Under the guise of cleaning 
.=; p crime in Java's streets, the mili-
tary is bypassing Indonesia's con-
; stitutional guarantees of due pro-
c cess and right to trial. E In Jogjakarta alone, Indonesia's 
•n second city, where I live, more than 
' {:. 250 bodies have found their way to 
the basement of Sardjito Hospital, 
~ a large government hospital; and 
cti hundreds of others have reportedly 
~ been thrown in the rivers around 
:r the city. Some people apparently in 
the know say the death total ex-~ ceeds 600 - and this is just in 
C:: Jogjakarta. The killing is taking .~ place in cities throughout Java . 
.µ I have witnessed two of these g killings. In one instance six men, all 
$... clearly military, dragged a suspect 
,S to a garbage dump, drew knives 
C:: and methodically stabbed him to 
H death while hundreds of people 
watched from the road above and 
listened to the man's screams. 
In another instance, in the south-
ern part of the city, military men 
looked on as a mob they had in-
spired clubbed a man to death. 
The victims are accused of being 
ga/is, or members of protection 
rackets. In the early days of this 
crackdown, about two months ago, 
the most common method was to 
arrest them, tell them to run and 
shoot them in the back. As happens 
in situations like this, there have 
been some mistakes made and in-
nocent people have been killed. 
Many others who were only small-
time thieves have been killed. 
Everyone I know in Jogjakarta, 
whether Indonesian or foreign, bas 
either seen one of these killings or 
beard a firsthand account. For 
weeks this has been the hottest 
topic of .conversation in town. 
There is no secret. People are 
being murdered by the hundreds 
and yet for some reason no one 
seems to have written an accurate 
account in the international press. 
Name witheld by request. 
Jogjakarta, Indonesia. 
distance of 25-60cms. Sometimes, the pistol has been fired right 
close to the skin. Many bodies have several gunshot wounds, 
which means that the killer wanted to make sure his victim was 
dead. In most cases, shots were fired from in front of the victim, 
not from behind, which means that the assassin and victim were 
face to face. Some bodies have bullets from more than one 
weapon." It is not difficult to conclude, he is reported to have 
said, where these 'mysterious killers' come from and for whom 
they are working. (Tempo, 4 June 1983) 
* At 2am, the body of Madadi was found near a bridge at 
Cakung junction, North Jakarta. The victim had been taken from 
his home the previous night . .. Almost simultaneously, another 
murder took place in Tanjungpriok, Jakarta. Ramil bin Sardi was 
taken from his home by four armed men whose faces were 
covered with handkerchiefs. Within yards of their home, Ramil's 
brother Eddi saw him being struck on the head with a pistol. Then 
a man shouted: "Don't waste time. Shoot him." Eddi then saw a 
pistol being aimed at his brother's head, just below the ear. He 
heard a shot, not very loud, then the four men jumped into the 
jeep and drove away . (Tempo, 18 June 1983) 
* Records at the University of Indonesia Criminology Institute 
show that 48 bodies with gunshot wounds have been found in 
Jakarta since January this year. 21 were discovered in May alone, 
and by the beginning of the second week of June, another ten 
bodies had been found . .. In Bandung, more than 20 bodies have 
been found ... The number of deaths from gunshot wounds in 
Central Java has reached 70, of which 60 occurred in 
Jogjakarta ... (Tempo, 18 June 1983) 
* Police Chief, Lieutenant-General Anton Sajarwo refused to 
make any comment when asked about the killings, except to say: 
"As far as I'm concerned, the main thing is security . .. " Some 
people link the wave of killings to a statement made early last year 
by Admiral Sudomo, then commander of KOPKAMTIB. He 
said, when speaking of the need to combat bus piracy, that 
"specially-trained killer squads (emphasis from Tempo) will be 
formed." That's what now seems to have happened, said one 
observer ... (Tempo, 18 June 1983) 
* The killer squads operate with a high degree of efficiency . 
Having received information, presumably from the police, the 
'mysterious killers' make straight for their victim. He is 
kidnapped from his home or from wherever he happens to be at 
the time ... then dragged to a waiting vehicle. What happens 
inside is not clear, but the vehicle makes for some deserted spot, 
and not long after, the body is found lying in the street. 
The killers are men with athletic bodies, they take action with 
firm deliberation, and appear to be trained for anything. A squad 
usually consists of four men. The shots are aimed at parts of the 
body which are certain to prove fatal. "Shots elsewhere in the 
body are a kind of bonus" said forensic expert Dr. Abdul Mun'in. 
"Most of the bullets being used are shiny, as if they have just been 
taken from the place where they were manufactured." What does 
this all mean? asked Tempo. "You can draw your own 
conclusion," he replied. (Tempo, 18 June 1983) 
* In Medan, five deaths have been reported, as the operations 
of dea~h squads spread to North Sumatra. In April, as killer 
operat10ns co!11menced in Jaka~a, it is known that the police in 
Medan were mstructed to comptle a list of people known to be 
'potential prison inmates'. A list of no fewer than 900 names was 
drawn up, complete with photographs, addresses, and other 
details, involving people in Medan, Labuhanbatu, Lasngkat and 
Asahan. "This means," said one Tempo source, "that the killers 
are unlikely to miss their targets". (Tempo, 2nd July, 1983.) 
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On 30 December 1982, 82 pages of military documents containing instructions to the Indonesian troops in 
East Timor were captured by Fretilin, the resistance movement. The documents were contained in a folder 
marked "KODIM 1628/06 BAKAU TIMTIM" and "BAURAH 1628/06" which . stands for Military District 
Command, Baucau, East Timor. 
There are eight documents in the folder, seven of which are marked 'secret' at the top and bottom of each 
page. The eighth is marked 'restricted'. 
A complete set of these documents has been made available to TAPOL. We reproduce in this supplement 
translated sections from five of these documents. Care has been taken to stick closely to the original texts. 
Headings in italics, and sentences in italics and within square brackets are not taken direct from the original text. 
How to Cope with 'Troublesome' Villages 
Military Resort Command (Korem) 164 
Wira Dharma 
Intelligence Section 
Instruction Manual 
Subject: The Way for Babinsa or Team Pembina 
Desa to Expose/Dismantle (Membongkar) GPK 
Support Networks 
I Introduction 
In Instruction Manual no . JUKNIS, dated 30-8-82 on the activities of 
the Babinsa in territorial intelligence, it was stated that there are 
''Degrees of Troublesome-ness (kerawanan)* of Villages'' which are 
determined by several factors , including: 
1. Villages that are birth-places ofGPK leaders. For instance, Saelari 
is the native village of Mauk Muruk, Bualale/Laoserolai is the native 
village of David Alex . 
2. Villages whose Iiurai have sons or daughters who are still in the 
bush. 
3. Villages many of whose inhabitants are still in the bush. For ex-
ample, there are still 91 from Maluro, 84 from Saelari, 66 from Atelari, 
18 from Samalari, 28 from Tekinomata, and so on. 
4. Villages where most of the inhabitants have just come down from 
the bush. For example, villages where many of the people come down 
in 1979 and 1980 are certain to be more troublesome than villages whose 
inhabitants came down in 1977. 
5. Villages most of whose inhabitants consist of ex-GPK and who 
came down on the basis of plans to destroy ABRl/TNI from within. 
6. Villages many of whose inhabitants are disgruntled because of 
past deeds on the part of ABRI-TNI. 
7. Villages that are not yet able to provide sufficient foodstuff for 
their own inhabitants. For instance, villages in the kecamatan of Laga, 
Baguia and Queliqai. 
8. Villages the composition of whose population is (completely) 
heterogenous, and there is no unity or harmony within the village. 
9. Villages whose entire population consists of people from other 
villages that have not yet been rebuilt, so that the land which they 
are now cultivating is not their own. For instance, villages whose 
inhabitants still live in the kecamatan (town). 
Such villages are 'troublesome' because there is a greater possibility 
for "GPK support networks" to exist. Even so, this does not mean 
that other villages are clean of GPK support networks. Every possibility 
still remains. Therefore, the Babinsa and Team Pembina Desa (TPD) 
who work in villages in general as well as those who work in 
" troublesome" villages must be able to expose/dismantle (mem-
bongkar) support-networks in their villages. Until these GPK support 
networks have been exposed/dismantled, the efforts to eradicate the 
GPK remnants will not succeed. What is the way to do this? This will 
be explained in this Instruction Manual. 
IT The structure of GPK support networks 
1. The division into regions by the GPK 
The GPK divides East Timor into three military regions which they call: 
a. the Funu Sei Hafatin Military Region (the region of B;Jucau-
Viqueque and Los Palos). 
b. The Nakroman Military Region (the region of Manatuto). 
c. The Haksolok Military Region (the western sector). 
2. The Funn Sei Hafatin Military Region 
a. Their region commander is Marcur (Rubeleki) who comes 
from Ualili. 
b. Their Political Commissar is Tito Ililawa (Loro Timur 
Anan) who comes from Iliomar. 
c. This Military Region is sub-divided into two sub-regions: 
i. The Funuk sub-region (to the east of Matabean 
Mountain) . 
ii . The Nafatin sub-region (to the west of Matabean 
Mountain) . 
d . The Ki-I Red Brigade, led by Palo Chai (Iliomar 
Komlek) is located in the Funuk sub-region. In addition 
to Ki-I, the Red Brigade commander, Mauk Muruk (who 
comes from Saelari village) together with his bodyguard, 
is also in this region (the Saelari complex). 
e. The Ki-II Red Brigade, led by David Alex (who comes 
from the Bualale village/Laesorolai), is located in the 
Nafatin sub-region. In addition to Ki-II , the Ki-ill Red 
Brigade which is led by Kalisa together with Ologari 
(deputy of Mauk Muruk), often operates in this sub-
region (Uaibobo-Builo complex). 
3. Cernak (Celula) 
· a . Each of these sub-regions is further divided into districts 
which they call Cemak, or Centro de Resistancis Na-
sional (Centres of National Resistance) which is a body 
that collects data from several Nurep. 
b. The Cemak or Celula in some regions of the Funuk sub-
region have been exposed/dismantled; these are Celula 
Ill, 112, 113, 114and 115. 
c. Those in the Nafatin sub-region still have to be expos-
ed/dismantled by both the Babinsa and the TPD. 
[A page from this · Manual is missing at this point] 
1. Nurep members in the settlements (they include ordinary people, 
Hansip/Ratih members and even community leaders; they are motivated 
by family ties, because they feel disgruntled towards ABRl/TNI, they 
fear being intimidated, and so on) look for and collect anything need-
ed by the GPK (information, clothing, food and so on), and these things 
are given to Nurep members outside the village or settlement. These 
meetings can take place in gardens, in forests or places agreed by them. 
2. The Nurep who are outside the settlement then report the informa-
tion or hand over the clothing or food to the OC (Orgao Coordinator) 
who is a member of the Cemak and operates as a Political Assistant 
(ajunto) . The OC members and Cernak members are in the GPK and 
they are the ones who are in .the bush. 
3. With the help of this information, clothing and food, the GPK is 
able to continue with its guerilla activities. 
4. If GPK me~bers fell ill and are no longer able to carry weapons, 
they are appomted to become Nurep. 
*kerawanan: carries the idea of restlessness, instability, cause of trouble. The 
closest English word to the meaning here intended is the adjective 'troublesome' 
To retain this meaning, the derived abstract noun 'troublesome-ness' is used 
in these translations. 
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5. Conversely, if a Nurep is restored to health, or if there is a cadre 
(someone in the settlement who has been influenced), that person returns 
to operate as a troop member of GPK. 
III How do the Babinsa or TPD 
expose/dismantle these GPK support 
networks? 
1. By investigating each of the persons from the village who are still 
in the bush, together with their relatives. · 
[There follows a table setting out the kind of information needed about 
such people. The columns record age, sex., education, occupation, 
firearms, family and other remarks, such as whether any relative is 
now in Atauro] 
2. Try to capture a Nurep or GPK member by making investigations 
about the GPK family still in the village or by making patrols around 
the s"ettlement, or by asking those GPK who have surrendered or been 
captured and who come from the village in question. 
3. Interrogate/investigate the person in question to find out who it is 
who helps them in the settlement, to find out who his comrades in Nurep 
or GPK are in the Cernak. 
Instructions regarding interrogations 
a. Use a native-born interpreter who can be trusted. 
b. Prove to the person (under interrogation) that his friends are 
still alive because they made honest confessions and were 
prepared to help ABRl/TNI for the early restoration of 
security. 
c. Avoid using violence that would result in the person under 
interrogation sealing his/her lips or giving false information 
and creating anxiety in the community. 
d . Questions should be asked about the following 
who is still helping them in the settlement; 
- who is the Nurep operating outside the settlement 
- who is still a member of GPK in the Cernak or with the 
troops; 
- the organisation and method of operation of the above 
three. For instance, who is the commander, chairman, per-
son in charge, the one who issues orders. Where and how 
do these people meet their members . 
4. Transfer to Atauro or to other places designated for this purpose those 
in the GPK support network who are still in the settlement and the 
relatives of GPK who have not yet been sent away. In this way, we 
can cut the ties between the support networks in the settlements and 
the Nurep. 
5. Try to capture the Nurep and the GPK members who are outside 
the settlement: 
a. Nurep and GPK members who surrender or are captured 
should be asked to bring down their comrades who are 
still outside the settlement with the movement. 
b. Those Nurep or GPK who surrender or are captured 
should be told to call to their comardes through loud-
speakers. 
c. Hold tebe-tebe (traditional dance) festivals so as to make the 
Nurep still outside the settlement feel a longing for their 
village and then come down. 
d. Disseminate information to show that those who 
genuinely come down will be well received (won't be 
murdered) . 
e. Other methods can be cultivated by the Babinsa or TPD. 
Those Nurep or GPK members who come down must be put in places 
that are separated from other people so as to prevent any contact. Even 
so, they must continue to be 'guided' as well as possible so as to give 
them a better picture of things , and ensure on the one hand that they 
don't try to take to the bush a~ain, whilst on the other hand bringing 
over their comrades who are still in the bush. 
6. In order to break the link between the Nurep and the armed GPK 
members as well as bringing the Nurep down, patrols should be organis-
ed round the settlements particularly round the people's gardens which 
are suspected of being meeting places. 
7. Whilst exposing the GPK support networks, simultaneously carry 
out efforts to draw the sympathy of the village . Remember that peo-
ple's sympathy is based first and foremost on the stomach, on their 
customs and on giving them a picture of a better life. 
a. Help people tend their gardens or fields. 
b. Help overcome food shortages (report to the Kodim com-
mander if food supplies are indeed needed). 
c. Help set up cooperatives if possible. 
d. Show respect for local customs. 
e. Build the village by setting up sanitary facilities, schools, 
village halls or other facilities needed by the people to 
give them a better picture of life . 
f. Other activities that can be developed by the Babinsa or 
TPD which are basically aimed at attracting people's 
sympathy. 
[The remainder of this Manual is missing] 
The Eight Documents 
Title 
Babinsa/TPD's role in exposing/dismantling GPK support networks 
System of security in towns and settlement areas. 
The village as focal point of attention and how to 'guide' it 
comprehensively 
How to protect the community from the influences of GPK propaganda 
Babinsa/TPD activity in promoting and phasing out trained people's 
resistance forces 
Established Procedure for razzias in settlement areas 
Established Procedure for interrogation of prisoners 
Plans for the promotion of trained people's (Ratih) units. 
Reference No. 
JUKNIS/05/111982 
JUKNIS/O 1-A/IV I 1982 
JUKNIS/04-B/IV I 1982 
JUKNIS/06/IV I 1982 
PROT AP 101/VII/1982 
PROT AP 101-B/VII/ 1982 
Date of Issue 
Last page is missing 1 
Not given.2 
September 10, 1982 
September 10, 1982 
September 10, 1982 
July 8, 1982 
July 8(?), 1982 
September 10, 1982. 
1. Although the date is therefore not available, it is clear from references made in the text that this document was issued after August 1982 
2. The reference number makes it clear that this document was issued in 1982. 
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How to Prevent Contact 
Between Fretilin and the Community 
Military Region Command (Korem) 164 
Wira Dharma 
Intelligence Section 
Instruction Manual No: JUKNIS/04-B/IV /1982 
Subject: How to Protect the Community 
from the Influences of GPK Propaganda 
[The first two sections of this Manual give a description of how the 
'GPK' establishes links with people living in the settlements 
(pemukiman) . This is said to take place when the inhabitants go out 
to tend their fields; while there, they are contacted by a 'GPK' member 
known as a Nurep. After several contact meetings like this, a 'GPK 
support-network' is set up inside the settlement. One specific example 
is given. In this case, the 'suppon network' was headed by a primary 
school pupil. Then, a 'GPK' member deliberately surrendered, became 
an accepted pan of the community, and eventually took command of 
the 'suppon network '. The schoolboy then became second-in-command:] 
III Ways to protect people from the 
influences of GPK propaganda 
An experience like the above, based on actual fact, must not be allowed 
to occur again in any settlement or town. In order to prevent this hap-
pening, the Kodim, Koramil and in particular the Team Pembina Desa 
(TPD) and Babinsa must carry out various activities, including : 
I. Intensifying control of the population. 
Every single activity of the population must be known exactly , in the 
following ways: 
a . Appoint reliable people as Katuas to help neighbourhood chiefs 
(RT). Arrange it in such a way that each Katuas takes responsi-
bility for 10-15 families . Each katuas must be able to know 
exactly the activities of the families under his guidance; for 
example, when they go to their field, go to collect wood, go 
to another village, go to tend flocks, go to market and so on. 
b . Appoint an 'informer' in each group of 10-15 families led by 
one Katuas . This informer should be able to follow , secretly, 
all the activities of these 10-15 families. 
c . Every time anyone goes out of the village, he/she must have 
a travel pass (surat jalan), and every person who comes into 
the village from another village must report . 
d . Inspection posts must be set up to keep a check on everyone 
who enters or leaves the village. 
e . Maintain an element of surprise (pendadakan) by holding 
extraordinary roll-calls , or by having check-ups on the 
population by the Katuas , to check whether anyone has left 
without permission or whether anyone has arrived from another 
village without reporting . 
f. Take other actions, according to circumstances in each village, 
for the purpose of intensifying control over the population. For 
instance, house-to-house visits, and patrols inside the village 
to prevent illegal meetings form taking place there . 
2. Re-arrange the location of gardens and fields of the population. 
· a . . There should be no gardens or fields of the people located 
far from the settlement or village. 
b . No garden or field of anyone in the village should be 
isolated (situated far from the others). Arrange preferably 
for all the gardens and fields to be close to each other. 
c. When people go to their gardens or fields, no-one should 
go alone; they should go and return together. 
3. Organise patrols round the village. 
a . Organise patrols round the village particularly in the 
vicinity of the gardens and fields of the people, so as to 
prevent any meetings between the Nurep/GPK and the 
population. 
b. Go round during the night stealthily, particularly to the 
people's gardens and fields. 
c. In addition to these patrols , send 'satellites' to places 
round the village where it is suspected that meetings bet-
ween Nurep/GPK and the population might take place. 
d. Guard the population's gardens and fields from disturb-
ances/thefts/attacks by the GPK. 
4. Consolidate Hansip and Ratih. 
a. Get to know the members of Hansip and Raith and their 
families one by one. 
b. Carry out activities listed in Instruction Manual No. 
JUKNIS/06/IV 11982, April 2, 1982 regarding the activities 
of the Babinsa/TPD in promoting and phasing out trained 
people's resistance forces, under point 9 c.2, namely: 
(i) by establishing a high standard of discipline, like the 
discipline in ABRI: 
(ii) give constant indoctrination to establish consciousness 
regarding the need to defend the state and prevent infiltra-
tion of negative influences from GPK remnants . Explain 
that everything the GPK says is untrue. This will ensure 
that Hansip and Raith are not influenced by their 
propaganda. 
(iii) Keep strict control of weapons. 
(iv) Re-check so as to make sure that there are no GPK 
sympathisers among members of the Hansip and Raith. 
(v) Appoint those of their leaders (Ru, Ton, and Ki com-
manders) who can be one hundred per cent trusted by us. 
(vi) Show appreciation to those who have achievements to 
their credit. 
c. Provide opportunities for Hansip and Ratih to rest, so as to 
give them a chance to tend a garden or field. 
d. Provide them with the opportunity for recreation, such as 
sports and so on. 
5. Organise information work to neutralise GPK propaganda. 
a. Kodim will try to send information consisting of community 
)~de.rs and e~-G_PK ~pie who are now helping us, to pro-
vide information m the village, to explain that all the GPK pro-
paganda is untrue. 
b. In addition, efforts will be made to send films showing the 
government's efforts to develop East Timor. 
c . Efforts will also be made to provide a Map oflndonesia show-
ing East Timor located in the territory of Indonesia. ' 
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d. Whilst waiting for the above three points to materialise, each 
Babinsa/TPD will give information to Hansip and Ratih 
members, to the ex-GPK in the village, as well as to the in-
habitants . The ways to do this include: 
(i) Supply information about the things that are to be explained 
to community leaders and ex-GPK who are now helping us . 
For example: 
• That GPK propaganda is untrue. 
• That the government, together with the entire people 
of East Timor, is now trying hard to develop East 
Timor so that the living conditions of the community 
improve. 
(ii) Train community leaders and ex-GPK to become infor-
mation experts, and get them to explain these matters in the 
presence of an interpreter who can be trusted. 
(iii) Gather the people together and instruct this information 
person to give a talk, and instruct the interpreter to check that 
the person says the right things. 
(iv) Besides giving direct information in this way, carry out 
indirect information work by giving people who can be trusted 
the task of making home visits to the people of the village. 
(v) Give the best possible 'guidance' to those ex-GPK peo-
ple who have come down from the bush: 
• keep them under special supervision; 
• give them things to do to keep them busy; 
• consider their living circumstances so that they get a 
better picture of life; for instance, consider providing 
them with a home, a garden or field, and so on. 
• hold frequent discussions with them to fill their minds 
with the correctness of integration, so as to eliminate 
any remaining ideas from the time they were in the 
bush. 
• tell them about the efforts being made by their com-
rades still in the bush to influence them, so that they 
remain vigilant and don't allow themselves to be 
influenced. 
IV Conclusion 
This Instruction Manual is issued to complement earlier Manuals, par-
ticularly regarding territorial intelligence. Because the Babinsa and TPD 
are the most 'advanced' territorial element, the success or otherwise of 
our efforts to protect people from the influence of GPK propaganda 
depends to a very great extent upon these Babinsa and TPD. Therefore, 
these instructions must be implemented as well as possible. 
All success to you in the performance of your duty, because God 
is on our side. 
Issued in Dili, on 10th September 1982 
Intelligence Officer 
Williem da Costa 
Infantry Major No. 24293 
....---·· 
Legend: laporan = report 
surat jalan = travel pass 
kebun = garden 
desa lain = another village 
mengembala = tending flocks 
ABRI/TNI: 
Babinsa: 
Ba Intel: 
Bater: 
Binpolda: 
Cernak: 
GPK: 
Hansip: 
Katuas: 
· Kecamatan: 
Kodim: 
Koramil: 
Liurai: 
Nurep: 
Ratih: 
Ru-Ton-Ki: 
Satgas Intel: 
TBO: 
Team Pembina 
Desa (TPD): 
Wanra: 
Yon 745: 
Glossary 
Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Army. 
Badan pembinaan desa , or village 'guidance ' body ; 
formally , a branch of civilian authority but in East 
Tirnor the post is invariably occupied by military 
personnel. As the documents show, babinsa is 
directly subject to army instructions . 
Intelligence Agency (military) . 
Territorial Agency (military) . 
Not clear. The 'pol' indicates it is part of the police 
force . 
A term used in the resistance military structure, 
according to these documents . 
Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan or ' security-disruption 
gangs', the term offically used for Fretilin , the East 
Timor resistance movement. 
Civil guard . 
People appointed to supervise groups of families ; 
they are presumably 'trustworthy' Timorese. 
Sub-district administrative unit . The tenn is also used 
for the administrative centre of the Kecamatan . 
Military District Command. A sub-division of 
military command, immediately under Korem , which 
stands for Military Resort Command. East Timor is 
Korem 1628, a military sector of the Udayana 
Military Command, based in Den Pasar. 
Military Rayon Command, the commands under the 
Kodim. 
Timorese traditional chieftain . 
According to these documents, the contact persons 
between the Tesistance and the population Jiving in 
Indonesian-occupied territory . The derivation of this 
word is not clear from the documents . 
Trained people's units (of Timorese) , which are 
apparently to replace the Hansip. 
Military sub-units in Fretilin's command structure, 
according to these documents . 
Special Tasks Intelligence Unit . 
Tenaga Bantuan Operasi, apparently auxiliary 
operational units , consisting of Timorese. 
Village 'Guidance' teain. 
" Arurther term used for Hansip, derived from 
·s~karelawan rakyatJ meaning 'people' s volunteers ' . 
Battalion 745, one of the battalions that has regularly 
operated in East Timor. 
Surat,~ Kobun 
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How to Win the War in the Villages 
Military Resort Command (Korem) 164 
Wira Dharma 
Intelligence Section 
Instruction Manual No: JUKNIS/Ol-A/IV/1982 
Subject: The Village as Focal Point of Attention 
and How to 'Guide' it Comprehensively 
I Introduction 
[This first section explains the necessity for abandoning the previous 
approach and adopting the one outlined below.] 
II Why the village as the focal point of 
attention? 
A previous instruction manual has explained how the remaining GPK 
are trying to "wrest control of the village" by establishing support 
networks via the Nurep. Conversely, we too are trying to gain con-
trol of the village via the Babinsa, so as to immunise it against such 
GPK influence. In other words, every village will become the object 
ofa contest (perebtltan) between ourselves and the GPK-and whoever 
wins that will also win the guerilla/anti-guerilla war: 
That is why every level of the territorial apparatus must focus its 
attention upon the village in this way. This is why Team Pembina Desa 
(TPD) have lately been sent into those villages specially thought to 
be troublesome (rawan) . 
How to 'guide' the village comprehensively 
By "comprehensively" is meant knowing the village inside-out, in its 
entirety-its conditions, problems faced by its inhabitants-and also 
'guiding' it in the sense of painting a better picture of life. 
Activities to be carried out for this purpose: 
I. Looking at the "inner workings" (isi perut) of every village: 
Instruction Manual No. JUKNIS/Ol/Xl/1981, of 15-11-1981 concern-
ing the keeping of a book for the Babinsa's data and events, explains 
that in order to know a village well, it is essential to have data and 
notes on events within the village. These include: 
a. Sketch map of the old village (pre-upheaval). 
b . Sketch map of the present village; 
c. Village security system. 
d. Genealogy of the chieftain. 
e. List of village government officials. 
f. List of catechists. 
g. List of other community figures. 
h. Others (refer to the above-mentioned manual) . 
It is not only the Babinsa who needs to have such data, but also the 
Koramil and Kodim. Thus every level of the territorial apparatus will 
know for certain the inner workings of the villages. 
Example of looking at the inner workings of Bualale village: 
a. Bualale consists of two kampung, Lia Lura and Ossomeca. 
In the time of the Portuguese, the inhabitants were spread bet-
ween the two kampung. With the upheavals, they fled into 
the bush . Once they had returned, they were resettled in the 
present location-the kecamatan town of Quelicai-in May 
1979. But this led to their being unable to grow food on their 
own land, so that food shortages have occurred . Thus efforts 
are currently being made to get the people back to their original 
lands-about 4km. to the south of Quelicai-as part of a set-
tlement programme of 30 villages. 
b. Bualale is the native village of the GPK figure David 
Alex (Commander of Ki-II Red Brigade), and thus has 
always been an area in which he operates . Moreover the 
area is extremely fertile-another r€?ason for the move 
back to the original lands. While the people will be able 
to grow food , thus preventing further shortages, the move 
will also cut down the GPK's area of operations, 
c. 
especially that of the David Alex group . 
Inhabitants number 413: 206 male, 207 female. 
d. Those of the village still in the bush number 15, 
including David Alex. 
e. Of relatives of villagers still in the bush: 
i. 13 have been sent to Atauro 
ii. 2 have not yet been sent 
iii. None have yet returned . 
f. Ex-GPK's currently living in the village number 17 
persons. 
g. The former kepala desa (village head) , Francisco Freitas, 
is at present in Buibao, while the new one, Bartolomeus, 
carries a fair amount of authority with the inhabitants and 
is assisting the operation for the restoration of security. 
h. Apart from the kepala desa , there are two community 
figures with quite a lot of influence, i.e. a religious 
teacher (catechist) and an elder. If they are properly 
'guided', they should both be very useful. 
i. The people's participation in security and development is 
fairly good, even though it is believed that there is still a 
GPK support network, either because they are afraid, are 
being forced, or for other reasons. 
j . Hansip/Wanra strength stands at 10 persons with 7 
weapons . 
k. A Ratih of one squad with 10 weapons has been set up. 
I. There are four Hansip/W anra/Ratih widows requiring special 
attention. 
m. The number of people outside Hansip/Wanra/Ratih who 
could be mobilised at any time is 50. 
n. Additional data which could be compiled and which 
would essentially depict the condition of the village. 
2. Identifying problems faced by the villagers: 
Bring together the local community figures-kepala desa, kepala kam-
pung, teachers and any other influential figures-and invite them to 
discussions identifying the problems the community faces in security 
and/or development. The results of such discussions will complete the 
picture of the village's inner workings obtained from the earlier data. 
This kind of discussion should be carried out not only by the Babin-
sa/TPD, but also by Koramil and Kodim when they go to the village. 
Thus each level will really get to know the conditions and problems 
faced by the village concerned. 
These discussions are most important, so that 'guidance' plans really 
accord with the needs of the local people. We often have plans which 
are in our own opinion good, but what is good for us is not necessarily 
good for the local people. That is why the opinions of the local com-
munity figures have to be listened to. If a plan is drawn up jointly, 
the easier its subsequent implementation will be, because the people 
will feel they have been involved. 
*In addition to the basic meaning of guiding, "membina" in Indonesian car-
ries a strong sense of moulding , shaping-as with figures from clay. Hence 
the quotation marks used throughout these translations . 
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On Torture, and How to Keep it Secret 
Military Region Command XVI 
Udayana 
Military Resort Command (Korem) 164 
Wira Dharma 
Established Procedure No. PROTAP/Ol-B/VII/1982 
Subject: Method of Interrogating Prisoners 
[The first four sections of this document set out the reasons why prisoners 
need to be interrogated, namely in order to obtain information about 
the whereabouts and methods of operation of the people fighting in 
the bush. ] 
V Things that must be avoided 
11. To prevent the collection of inaccurate information through inter-
rogations, there follows an account of some things that must be avoided 
during the course of interrogations. 
a . forcing the wishes of the interrogator; 
b . the use of violence and threats 
c . drawing conclusions too hastily . 
12. Forcing the wishes of the interrogator 
A frequent mistake committed by interrogators is that, at the very start 
of the interrogation, the interrogator has already placed the person being 
interrogated in the position of being guilty . And consequently every 
question asked by the interrogator only remains to be answered, yes 
or no. 
Such methods must stop since the person being interrogated is (not) 
given the chance to speak freely because all the questions are loaded, 
meaning that if he says anything else, no notice will be taken, especially 
if such questioning is accompanied by violence. 
13. The use of violence and threats. 
Hopefully, interrogation accompanied by the use of violence will not 
take place except in certain circumstances when the person being in-
terrogated is having difficulty telling the truth (gives evasive replies). 
continued from opposite page 
Example of conducting a discussion: 
Bring up a few points, e.g. How do the community figures think security 
could soonest be restored? What do they think could be done to deprive 
the GDK of local assistance? What do they think is the best way to 
get remaining GDK back in from the bush? What type of development 
do they think the village needs? 
A variety of questions like these will produce opinions we had 
not previously thought of. If these are parallel to our planned opera-
tions .. so much the better, and we can go ahead as planned. If not, 
eg. if they request the return of relatives from Atauro, then we will 
have to explain once again the reasons for their relatives' having been 
removed to Atauro. 
3. Drawing up 'guidance' plans: 
Based on the outcome of the aforementioned discussions , draw up a 
good 'guidance' plan dealing with security and/or development. Because 
such a plan is the result of consultation, it will obviously gain the peo-
ple's support in its implementation. In this way the people will not 
just feel that they are being dictated to. A plan ofthis,cype must basically 
paint a better picture of life for the people. ~ 
4. Carry out evaluation (rea~essment): 
Once a plan has been implemented, carry out reassessment. Have things 
gone as planned? What were the shortcomings, what was the outcome? 
etc . This is important as source material for further planning . 
If it proves necessary to use violence, make sure that there are 
no people around (members of TBO, Hansip, Ratih or other people) 
to see what is happening, so as not to arouse people's antipathy . The 
use of violence often results in the person under interrogation being 
forced to admit guilt because of fear, and thereafter he/she will just 
comply with all the wishes of the interrogator. A void taking photographs 
showing torture in progress (people being photographed at times when 
they are being subjected to electric current, when they have been 
stripped naked, etc). Remember not to have such photographic 
documentation developed outside/Den Pasar which could then be made 
available to the public by irresponsible elements. 
It is better to make attractive photographs, such as shots taken while 
eating together with the prisoner, or shaking hands with those who 
have just come down from the bush, showing them in front of a house, 
and so on . If such photos are circulated in the bush, this is a classic 
way of assuredly undermining their morale and fighting spirits. And 
if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the church into 
supporting operations to restore security . 
14. Drawing conclusions too hastily. 
Interrogators must not draw hasty conclusions about the results of the 
interrogation. If necessary the interrogation should be repeated over 
and over again using a variety of questions so that, eventually, the cor-
rect conclusion can be drawn from all these different replies . 
[After another two sections, this Established Procedure concludes. ] 
issued in Dili on (date not legible) July, 1982 
Commander: 
A. Sabala Rajagukguk. 
Infantry Colonel, index number 18805 . 
III Village control command must also be 
comprehensive. 
There may be a variety of officials in the village, eg . Babinsa and Bin· 
polda; members of Yon 745 charged with 'guiding' the Ratih; Bater 
from other units; Ba Intel from the Satgas Intel or other units, and 
the Team Pembina Desa. All these officials must be able to coordinate 
so as to form a "comprehensvie team". 
[The remainder of the text sets out rules prescribing seniority in the 
appointment of team commander.] · 
!KODPll __ ~ 
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., 
How to 'Guide' the Village comprehensively 
Legend: Kodim , etc: see Glossary 
Keadaan = situation 
Masalahnya = the problems 
Membinanya = 'guiding' it 
desa = village 
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How to Raid Villages Before, 
During and After Armed Operations Against Fretilin 
XVlth Military Region Command 
Udayana 
Military Resort Command 164/WIRA DHARMA 
Established Procedure No. PROTAP/Ol-A/VII/1982 
Subject: Procedure for Razzias on 
Settlement Areas 
[The first two sections explain how 'GPK' guerillas have succeeded 
in past operations to avoid capture· by relying on support networks 
within the community, by obtaining sanctuary in villages and by merging 
with the population.] 
III Techniques for dealing with the GPK 
9. General 
In dealing with the guerillas, the best thing is to wage anti guerilla 
operations in which the basic activity is aimed at separating the guerillas 
from the People supporting them. 
In order to separate the GPK from the People supporting them, one 
way is to guard against or prevent the GPK from entering settlement 
areas to hide . A good way of dealing with their efforts to hide in 
settlement areas is to conduct razzias on kp [kampungs?], and these 
razzias can be conducted by: 
a. Conducting repeated razzias but at irregular intervals (irregular 
razzias) . 
b. Conducting razzias in settlement areas located in the vicinity 
where the target for an Operasi Kikis (Eradication Operation) 
is located . 
c. Conducting razzias in kp (kampung?) which lie close to the 
place where armed contact occurs . 
10. Irregular razzias 
By irregular razzias is meant conducting razzias suddenly and not 
according to a fixed time schedule, and conducting razzias on targets 
that have not been fixed in advance. These razzias can be conducted 
as follows : 
a . Partial method 
Conducted against villages one by one, in turn. 
Example : In Quiliqai kecamatan there are seven villages of 
which four are suspected as hiding places for the GPK. Razzias 
can be conducted against each of these four villages in turn 
and at irregular times. 
b. Simultaneous method 
Conducted simultaneously against all the villages in a 
kecamatan which are suspected as hiding places for the GPK, 
with the objective of ensuring tliat the GPK is not able to move 
from one place to another while the razzia is in progress . 
11. Razzias conducted whilst an Operasi Kikis is in progress 
In conducting a razzia of this kind, it is hoped that the GPK will not 
be able to hide in villages in the area which is the target of the Operasi 
Kikis . 
12. Razzias in villages near the location of an enemy attack 
This razzia is conducted after the GPK has waged an attack against 
a patrol (convoy) of ours, in cases where this attack was launch close 
to kampungs that can be used as hiding places . The purpose of this 
kind of razzia is to cut off the GPK's line of retreat . 
13. Razzia techniques 
In order to secure the maximum results, the following techniques can 
be used in conducting razzias: 
a . The units which are to conduct the razzia should be taken 
from those troops not involved in the Operasi (Kikis). 
b. The razzia plan should be known only to the Regional 
Unit Commander and the Intelligence Operation Staff Of-
ficer so that the plan does not leak to the community. 
c. If the razzia takes place at night, all the people are 
ordered not to leave their homes while the razzia is in 
progress; anyone who goes out of a house is regarded as 
beirig a GPK who is trying to run away . 
d. If the razzia takes place in the daytime, all the men and 
women are gathered in one place to listen to a lecture 
whilst officers conduct the razzia by entering the homes 
where the razzia is taking place. Steps should be taken to 
prevent people's property from being lost as a result of 
the razzia; if ·property is lost, this can be used by the 
enemy and their supporters for propaganda purposes. 
e. While the razzia is in progress, people are not allowed to 
enter or leave the settlement. Anyone moving around will 
be regarded as the enemy. 
f. Place patrol posts round the settlement in question, par-
ticularly at night. 
14. Other techniques 
Another method for conducting a razzia in a kampung is for the kampung 
in question to be encircled first, particularly closing off the roads leading 
into and out of the kampung, and thereafter the razzia is conducted 
only against those houses that are under suspicion. 
[This Established Procedure concludes with a further seven points regard-
ing the need for tight cooperation between the fighting units , and some 
administrative rules. ] 
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LBH chairman speaks out on death squads 
The following interview of Adnan Buyung Nasution, chairman of the Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes ( LBH), carried out in Holland on 4th 
June by Liem S. L. of the Indonesian Movement for Basic Human Rights and Democracy, and Willy van Rooijen, of Onze Wereld, has been 
made available for publication by TAPOL. 
During your last visit here last November, you mentioned killings 
in E. Java. But for most people these current killings have 
appeared out of the blue. Is that true? Can you explain the 
situation? 
The current killings started in Jogjakarta almost two months 
ago, when the commanding officer of the military garrison 
launched a military operation against so-called criminals. It was 
publicly and officially announced that this operation had started, 
and then, every day people were picked up, taken from their 
homes or wherever they happened to be at the time - in the 
market, on the street- and were later found dead. Bodies were 
left lying in the streets or thrown into the river; then later, a report 
would appear that a body had been found and that on checking, it 
was confirmed that it was a criminal who had been caught and shot 
trying to run away or for attacking the authorities. This kind of 
thing was happening every day. 
We protested about this but the killings continued. Then later 
on, the army commander of the whole of Java (the KOWILHAN 
commander, General Yogie Memet) announced that the 
operation had been very successful and he was therefore planning 
to extend it all over Indonesia. I took that statement as being 
firstly a reaction to our criticism, but then also it revealed a 
determination by the authorities to continue these actions. So we 
protested again and put out another statement; we called on 
others to support us. 
But the shocking thing was that, a couple of weeks after the 
general's statement, we realised that the same kind of operation 
had been launched in Jakarta, and was already in progress. The 
difference is that whereas in Jogjakarta, the military authorities 
had officially announced the operation and given it a name, in 
Jakarta, it was a silent operation, with no name and without any 
statement being made. 
What is the name of the operation? 
The 'operation to clean up criminals' or 'to combat 
criminality'. ( Operasi Penanggulangan Banditisme). In Jakarta, 
they didn't give it a name nor did they even announce it, but I 
heard from reliable sources that oral instructions had been given 
to operate in the same way as in Jogjakarta. 
It is quite obvious from your explanations that the military are 
directly involved in the killings. What kind of people perpetrate the 
killings? What kind of squads? 
We have heard that they are special squads. They are not 
ordinary militarymen or policemen but people who have been 
given what they call anti-terrorist training. 
Are they part of the Armed l:<'orces? 
Yes, but they are special troops who have been trained for 
special tasks. This operation is apparently the first task they have 
been given, which is why we believe it is a kind of exercise for 
them. They have chosen criminals as their victims which makes 
the whole thing a popular action, something that people can 
support. It makes me very sad to see that people don't realise the 
impact of these actions. The man on the street feels pleased 
because quick and resolute action is being taken. 
within the territory of my KOWILHAN. 
The operation, which is of great significance, 
is in the hands of the Jogjakarta garrison." 
Pointing out that there had been a marked 
fall in the number of crimes since the 
operation was launched, he said: "The aim 
of the operation is to create an atmosphere of 
calm in society, which is why it's not a bad 
idea to launch it in other cities." (Kompas, 
29th April, 1983) 
troops function at a particularly high level 
of discipline, they create no fuss and never 
complain. To serve with such a troop, you 
need a strong nerve, a great deal of skill and 
a lot of advanced scientific knowledge, as 
well as having first-rate physique, spirit and 
morale." 
Lieutenant-General Yogie Suardi Memet, 
newly-appointed Commander of KOWIL-
HAN II (Java and Madura): 
"It is highly likely that the Operation to 
Combat Criminality which is still in force in 
Jogjakarta, will be extended to other cities 
*** 
Lieutenant-General Yogie S. Memet took 
over as Commander of KOWILHAN II in 
February, just two months before the death 
squad operation was launched in 
Jogjakarta. 
Prior to his recent appointment, he spent 
eleven years in top command positions in 
KOPASSANDHA, (Komando Pasukan 
Sandi Yudha), the paratroop command 
formerly known as the RPKAD, the "red 
berets". He was Deputy Commander for 
nearly four years, then Commander for 
another seven. While Commander of 
K 0 P ASSA ND HA he was for several years 
concurrently commander of the Vlth (West 
Java) Siliwangi Division. 
Speaking with great enthusiasm of the 
years he spent in KOPASSANDHA, he 
said that it stood at the very pinnacle of the 
Indonesian army. "KOPASSANDHA 
T APOL Bulletin No. 58 July 1983 
*** 
General Ali Said, Minister of Justice: ''It is 
better to have a hundred dead criminals 
than a hundred thousand anxious citizens." 
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Buyung Nasution 
And how are these actions being carried out in practice? 
Even worse in Jakarta than in Jogjakarta . In Jakarta they pick 
people up sometimes during the day but also sometimes at night. 
Those picked up during the · day are taken to quiet streets or to 
places which are not very crowded. Then they beat the man up 
and shoot him. Many eye-witnesses who have seen the killings 
have said that they are carried out in a very demonstrative way, in 
public, without due process of the law. 
I have heard that the LBH has set up a task force to investigate all 
these cases. Can you tell us more about that? 
We heard that these things were happening in Jakarta and we 
also read about them in the press. Every morning, newspapers 
were reporting that bodies had been found, that people had been 
shot dead by unknown persons. The way the cases were reported 
in the press showed that they were prepared statements using 
similar language: a body had been found, killed by an unknown 
assailant and after checking, it had been discovered that it was a 
body of a criminal or recidivist being sought by the police who was 
shot as he tried to escape or because he attacked the military 
authorities. 
Why do you think the operation took on such a demonstrative 
character? 
In the first place, I think that there has been a steady rise in 
crime, not only in quantity but also in quality. It is also a fact that 
our law enforcement agencies, the police, haven't been able to 
cope with the situation. This is an embarrassment for the 
government because it is a challenge to its authority, and means 
that it is not able to maintain law and order or safeguard people's 
security. Yet, the formercommanderofKOPKAMTIB, Admiral 
Sudomo said repeatedly that Indonesia is the safest country in the 
world. Yet what is now happening is different; the rate of crime 
has risen. I think this might be a kind of desperation being felt by 
some people in the army who want to show that the army still 
exists and is determined to clean up the criminals and emerge o.nce 
again as the hero and protector of society. That can be the motive, 
but naturally we don't agree that such extreme measures are 
taken, that people can be simply bumped off like that. These 
killings are the beginning of a series of arbitrary actions by the 
authorities who think they can do whatever they like even if it goes 
against the principle of law as long as it is done for the sake ~f 
preserving their authority. It is very important to unders~and this 
way of thinking. They want to show that they have the nght, the 
complete right to take people's lives if these people are regarded 
as a threat, or as something that undermines their authority. 
So the question must now be, who next? 
Yes, that's what I'm getting at. If we tolerate their actions this 
time because it so happens that their chosen victims are criminals 
-mind you, they are not all criminals-then it is only a question 
of time before they decide to pick on, say, political dissidents or 
political opponents, or anyone they dislike . 
My second point about the reasons for their operation is that 
these actions create a precedent which can develop into a culture 
of violence. Those in power want society to accept the values of 
violence as a means, they want to teach people to accept violence 
as a norm or a value-system. Once society accepts this, we can get 
nowhere. 
You said just now that criminality has increased not only in 
quantity but also in quality. The crime rate is surely linked with 
poverty. The latest devaluation has placed poor people in a very 
bad situation, and it's quite logical for crime to increase in such 
circumstances. Why do the authorities never mention this and deal 
with crime as a symptom? 
It's that which brings me to my third point. If you talk about the 
crime rate and the little people involved, I think they are only the 
victims of a system of injustice, the product of injustice that has 
been going on for years, particularly after the various 
devaluations. Living standards have deteriorated, and all those in 
power want to do is wash their hands by killing these people. And 
besides, if we talk about criminality as a disease or threat to 
society, we can also ask: who is it who should be wiped out first, 
the little people or the 11uge-scale corruptors who are a far greater 
threat not only to the economy but to the whole nation. But 
nothing is being done about these people; again it's the little 
people who have been chosen as the victims. 
Are the criminals who are being picked up people who operate 
individually or are they involved in gangs? 
There is no evidence that they are organised in gangs. 
Your colleague Abdulrachman Saleh of the LBH was reported by 
AFP as saying that he didn't see any ties between these operations 
and political activities. 
Yet, as yet there is no evidence of any political motivation (on 
the side of the authorities) but nobody knows about the future. 
The fact is that the operations that took place last year against 
bandits in East Java were directed not only against bandits but 
also against Muslim leaders. 
Can you tell us more about that? 
Tha:t operation took place last year. It was directed against 
bandits who rob people's homes, and it later developed into 
killings of informal leaders in the villages. We received reports at 
the time but we couldn't establish any facts because all we had was 
hearsay evidence. The problem was that when we sent people out 
to collect evidence, nobody dared to speak up, they were so 
afraid. Also, the news reached us very late and the killings were 
not so conspicuously carried out. The killings occurred in remote 
places, not like now in urban regions. The impact was different. 
Volkskrant quotes General Benny Murdani as saying that these 
operations against bandits are good because Indonesia is now 
promoting tourism and they make Indonesia a safe country. What 
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is your comment? 
That just shows that these people have not the slightest idea 
what the rule of law means. All I can say is that generals, soldiers, 
are used to ~hinking that the end justifies the means. 
Is there any attempt by the authorities to justify the killings within 
any legal framework? They haven't declared a state of emergency, 
have they? 
There are absolutely no legal grounds whatsoever for these 
barbaric killings. They have never mentioned any legal basis. 
They haven't even thought of it. 
You once referred to this kind of thing as 'the arrogance of power', 
Yes, indeed, the arrogance of power. It is a fascist way of 
thinking whieh is very dangerous. It's a pattern of thinking that I 
really hate because people in power who think like that can do 
anything without the slightest regard for human life. 
There is another thing I'd like to stress: these killings also 
violate our new Procedural Code (KUHAP) enacted in 1981. The 
adoption of that Law was a masterly achievement, the result of a 
twenty-year struggle, a great step forward in our fight for human 
rights. But these new developments show that some people in 
authority have no intention of applying this Code, they have 
absolutely no respect for it. They are dealing with things in their 
own way, by killing people. The Code says that no-one may be 
arrested without a warrant, and when arrested, people should be 
interrogated fairly, in accordance with the principles of justice and 
human rights, then tried in a free, impartial court. But now, these 
principles seem to have no value at all. At the very least we can say 
there is hypocrisy in the regime: on the one hand, they have taken 
steps to improve the law and human rights but on the other hand, 
they go around killing people. 
Pris ma 
Indonesian journal of Social 
and Economic Affairs 
Social sciences monthly 
rebuked 
The following lettei; was sent to the editors of the leading social 
sciences journal Prisma, by an official of the Indonesian 
Department .of Information on 2nd March, 1983: 
After examining several issues of Prisma sent to the Department 
of Information as samples, some things were discovered which in 
our opinion, should have your serious attention. In a series on 
LEADERS, certain leaders are discussed such as Amir 
Syarifuddin, Aidit and Cornet Simanjuntak. In our opinion, 
giving the limelight to these people is a form of Communist 
Political Struggle so as to encourage the public, through the pages 
of Prisma, to accept once again the presence of the PKI in society 
or endeavouring to revive the PKI in Indonesia. The Prisma issues 
in question are: 
1. Prisma No.2, February 1982 containing an article entitled 
"Corne/ Simanjuntak Cahaya Datang/ah" written by Hersri S. 
2. Prisma No.5 containing an article entitled: "S.M. 
Kartosuwiryo, Orang Seiring Bertukar Jalan", written by 
Hersri S. aand Joebar Ajoeb. These writers are former PKI 
political prisoners from Buru Island. 
3. Prisma No.7, July 1982 containing an article entitled "Aidit 
dan Partai Pada Tahun 1950" written by Jacques Leclerc. 
Report or be shot 
People in Jogjakarta who are regarded as being gali-gali now have 
only two choices: to be shot dead on the spot or to report regularly 
to their local military commands. So far, 450 are now under 
obligatory reporting requirements in the city whereas a total of 
sixty have been shot dead. "They must continue to report until we 
decide that they have reformed," said Lieutenant-Colonel M. 
Hasbi, commander of the Jogjakarta Garrison. 
The 'lighter' cases are required to report to their local Korami/ 
whilst the 'heavier' cases must report to their Kodim. Artidjo 
Alkostar, a lawyer and director of the Jogjakarta Legal Aid 
Institute, who is acting on behalf of one of the 'heavier' cases, has 
protested publicly that his client is deadly scared of leaving his 
home for a single moment for fear of being shot at. A colleague of 
his was shot dead recently while out at work simply because he 
had missed a day's reporting. 
When people present themselves for the first time to a military 
command, they are required to answer questions, recording the 
names of their family and relatives as well as their friends. They 
are also required to sign a statement pledging not to engage in 
crime, and declaring: "If I violate this pledge., I am willing to have 
firm action taken against me by the (state) apparatus". 
Does 'firm action' include being shot dead, asked Artidjo 
Alkostar, in an interview with Tempo. When the question was 
raised with the garrison commander he said: "That's for us to 
decide. If anyone starts anything, they'll soon see what we mean 
by firm action". Nor would Lt-Col. Hasbi explain the army's 
criteria for deciding which cases are 'heavy' and which are 'light'. 
"That's our business." 
But whatever people say, reports Tempo, the army in 
Jogjakarta will continue with its policy. "We can be thankful," 
said Lt-Col. Hasbi, "that security was well kept both before and 
after the recent eclipse of the sun". (The eclipse was a major 
attraction for tourists from all parts of the world.) 
Source: Tempo, 25th June, 1983 
4. Prisma No.8, September 1982, containing an article entitled 
"Oerip Soemohardjo Kebungkaman Yang Ampuh" written 
by S. I. Poeradisastra. 
5. Prisma No.12, December 1982, written by Jacques Leclerc. 
Publication of the above articles is in conflict with MPRS 
decisions No. XXV ... (etc, etc) concerning "Dissolution of the 
Indonesian Communist Party and its Declaration as a Prohibited 
Organisation throughout the territory of the Republic of 
Indonesia and Prohibition of all activities to spread and develop 
Communist/Marxist/Leninist Ideas or Teachings". 
In relation to Law No.21, 1982 revising Law No.11, 1966 on 
Basic Provisions for the Press, the aforsesaid articles can be 
considered to be leading towards spreading Communist 
teachings, which can result in action being taken to close down 
your journal. 
We hope that Prisma will be more careful in. future and will 
avoid publishing such articles. We shall be grateful for your 
attention. 
Director for Journalistic Guidance 
Drs Daan S. Sahusilawane. 
MUNIR'S SUPREME COURT APPEAL NEVER HEARD 
Mohammed Munir who was chairman of the National 
Council of SOBSI, the All-Indonesia Federation of Labour 
until it was banned in 1965, and who is now under sentence 
of death, lost his chance to appeal to the Supreme Court 
because the time for doing so was said to have 'lapsed'. 
The last remaining chance for his sentence to be commuted 
now rests with a plea for clemency to President Suharto. 
The report in TAPOL Bulletin No 57 that the Supreme 
Court had turned down his appeal was incorrect.) 
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COMMENT 
Indonesia negotiates with Fretilin 
On the initiative of Indonesia, negotiations were held in East 
Tim or with Fretilin in March this year. The first talks were held on 
21st March when three Indonesian officials - two army officers 
including the East Timar intelligence chief, and the Timorese 
governor Mario Carrascalao - met the Fretilin commander 
Xanana. Two days later, the talks were resumed. This time, 
Indonesia was represented by its senior military officer in East 
Timor, Colonel Purwanto. 
The venue for the talks was Lari Guto, near Ossu, a village in 
the southern part of central East Timor, which is Fretilin-
controlled territory. An Indonesian proposal that the talks should 
take place at their Baucau air-base, with Fretilin forces being 
allowed to hold Indonesian officers as hostages, was turned down. 
Fretilin's counter-proposal was accepted. 
Agreement for a ceasefire was reached at the talks, and 
Fretilin apparently accepted Indonesian offers to transport sick 
and wounded guerillas to Dili for treatment, and to provide food, 
clothing and medicines to Fretilin forces in the bush. Xanana 
handed Purwanto a letter for President Suharto containing 
Fretilin's demands. As set forth in a Fretilin publication issued in 
Gusmao Xanana, commander ofFretilin's armed forces 
Lisbon in June, these are: 
1. The unconditional withdrawal of the Indonesian 
occupying forces from East Tim or. 
2. The entry of a United Nations peace-keeping force. 
3. The holding of free consultations with the people of East 
Timar. 
4. The maintaining of Falintil (the resistance armed forces) 
in the mountains in order to keep the people free from any 
pressure. 
Xanana's condition for the resumption of talks with Indonesia 
was that Indonesia should officially inform the UN of the 
ceasefire. 
Indonesia denies agreeing to a ceasefire 
News that negotiations had taken place first broke in an AFP 
report from Jakarta on 10th June. Several weeks later, Fretilin 
representatives abroad announced that they had received 
photographs and tapes of the negotiations. At the same time, Mgr 
Martinhu da Costa Lopez, former Bishop of Dili who is now in 
Lisbon, stated that the Indonesians had failed to honour an 
undertaking to publicise the ceasefire agreement internationally. 
This was denied by chief of Armed Forces Intelligence; Major-
General Subiyakto (recently appointed director of the National 
Defence Academy) who claimed that no concessions had been 
given to Fretilin and that the term ceasefire could not be used 
since "Indonesia is not involved in any war against an enemy". 
Nor was there any question of the UN being informed since 
Indonesia regards East Timor as "an internal affair". 
Shortly afterwards, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja took over as official spokesman and said that 
talks had been held but they were concerned solely with the 
question of an amnesty. "We have offered them a total amnesty," 
he declared. (TAPOL Bulletin readers will be well aware of what 
has happened in the past to Fretilin fighters who surrender to the 
Indonesian forces.) 
Mochtar has made no effort to deny the validity of the photos 
and tapes published or mentioned by Fretilin, which according to 
Fretilin confirm that a ceasefire agreement was concluded. 
Why did Indonesia initiate the talks? 
What are the motives behind Indonesia's negotiation 
initiative? There can be no doubt that Fretilin's military 
operations have greatly intensified since last year. In a message 
sent out late last year (see TAPOL Bulletin No.55, January 1983), 
Xan~na announced that Fretilin now has 6,800 people under 
arms, reorganised under a Revolutionary Council of National 
Resistance. According to one source, the most recent Fretilin 
offensive was launched in February this year when a large troop of 
guerrillas temporarily occupied five villages (Chris Huinder, in 
De Groene Amsterdamer, 29 June 1983). 
However, . it should also be noted that Indonesia's new 
negotiation initiative was taken two weeks after March 5th, the 
day on which the Australian Labour Party took office in 
Canberra. That government is bound by a policy of full support 
for E. Timor's right to self-determination, a policy which 
implicitly means de-recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East 
Tim or. 
Since the news of the negotiations broke ~n June, news 
commentators in Australia have concluded that Foreign Minister 
Bill Hayden must have been informed of the new development 
when he visited Indonesia in April. In any case, writes one 
commentator, Australian intelligence services WQuld certainly 
have intercepted messages that were being relayed between Dili 
and Jakarta at the time of the talks. Some commentators have 
therefore drawn the conclusion that this was the "changed 
situation" to which Bob Hawke referred during his June visit to 
Jakarta, which at the time seemed to have no basis in fact. (He 
argued then that his government could depart from ALP policy 
because conditions had changed since the policy was adopted in 
July last year.) 
The past and coming months up to October a:re decisive for the 
East Timor resolution at this year's UN General Assembly. The 
resoluti.on passed by a narrow majority (50 to 46, with 50 
abstentions) last year. A decision by the Australian government 
to stand by ALP policy and switch from opposing to supporting 
the resolution would put back Indonesia's strenuous efforts to 
have the resolution removed from the agenda. The Indonesian 
gover?~ent o?viously calculates that an atmosphere of 
negotiations will undermine support for East Timor and 
Stop Press 
An unofficial report received as we were going to press suggested 
that fighting had been resumed in the eastern part of E. Timor. 
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Indonesian military commander, Colonel Purwanto, with Gusmao 
Xanana, on March 23, 1983. 
strengthen Indonesia's claim that the question of East Timar can 
be resolved 'internally'. Indeed , the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (14 July 1983) quoted Foreign Minister Mochtar as saying 
that the talks were "aimed at pre-empting any foreign 
involvement ih the settlement of the dispute" . 
There are signs already that the Indonesian ploy is bearing 
fruit . Ken Fry, ALP Member of Parliament, who a few weeks 
earlier was expressing confidence that the parliamentary Labour 
Party would support moves to hold the Hawke government to the 
party's policy on East Tim or, has now said that reports about the 
talks had been a setback for these efforts; he expressed doubts 
whether' there would be enough members even to raise the issue in 
Caucus. (The Australian, 1July1983). 
Indonesia's 'Smiling Policy' 
Indonesia'~ decisiol) to initiate negotiations is . aimed at 
achieving two objectives: to undermine international lobbying in 
EasJ Timor's. favour so as to knock the question off the UN 
General Assembly this. year, and to extricate itself from a hard-
pressed military situation inside East Timar. Certainly, 
oper.ations to' send in supplies for the guerrillas and to ferry out 
wo4nded resistance fighters ~ust b~ giving them useful 
information about Falintil's positions. . 
In West Papua, Indonesian troops have several times offered 
talks with resistance leaders - the Mandatjan brothers in the 
1960s, and Martin Tabu in 1980 - only to betray and murder 
them. Since tl1e stakes were so high in this case, there was no 
immediate threat to the lives of Xanana and the other Faliritil 
leaders who met Purwanto in March. But the longterm effects of 
Photos recently received from liberated areas of E. Timor 
A play in progress 
the 'smiling policy' could be far more devastating. One thing is 
clear: whatever talks may be taking place , efforts internationally 
to increase support for East Timar at the UN must continue , while 
at the same time warning everyone concerned of the pitfalls of 
Indonesia's 'smiling' strategy. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
Catholic institute prevented 
from visiting E. Tirnor 
The London-based Catholic Institute of International Relations 
(CUR) which early last year was invited by the Indonesian 
Embassy in London to send a mission to East Timar, has now 
been prevented from making the visit. The invitation followed the 
publication by the CIIR of a Comment on East Timor, warmly 
welcomed in a Times editorial, which the Embassy claimed was 
based on inaccurate information. 
In May last year, the CIIR informed the Embassy of its wish to 
accept the invitation. Preparations to send a team of experts in a 
variety of fields were started, and the Embassy was kept informed 
throughout. In addition to a CIIR representative, the team would 
have included an expert in South East Asian law, experts in health 
and agriculture in the region, the OXFAM field officer in 
Indonesia , and linguists familiar with several East Timor 
languages as well as Portuguese and Indonesian. It would have 
been accompanied by a television team led by the well known 
journalist, Jon Snow. 
The CIIR kept the Embassy informed throughout that it 
planned to send the mission in July this year, for a period of at 
least eleven days with additional days in Jakarta. But the 
Embassy's invitation was never formally confirmed by Jakarta. 
In July this year , with all preparations finalised and the 
members having set aside time, the Embassy informed the CIIR 
that the mission would not now be allowed to visit in Jtily, and that 
a later date, November this year, might be possible. The CIIR 
regards this as a refusal as the .carefully-selected member~ could 
not have been requested to rearrange busy schedules again. Nor 
was the CIIR sure that this time, the invitation would be formally 
confirmed by Jakarta. In addition, the time suggested was 
unsuitable, coming in the rainy season when road travel is very 
difficult and the chances of visiting all parts of the country are very 
limited. 
TAPOL understands that the CUR, which accepted the 
Embassy's invitation in good faith and devoted considerable time 
and effort to organise a 'well-qualified team, and sent a staff 
person to Jakarta for consultatio9s with Catholic representatives 
and with the Centre for Strategic International Studies, very much 
regrets the lack of cooperation by the Indonesian government. It 
regards this as evidence that the government is not prepared to 
allow a team of qualified independent observers to visit East 
Timar in order to obtain an objective view of conditions there. 
Guerrilla troops 
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Hawke reneges on ALP's East Tinior policy 
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke has already reneged on 
major aspects of Australian Labour Party policy towards East 
Timor, and appears to be in the process of abandonding the entire 
programme unless opposition to this betrayal now developing 
inside the ALP can force a reversal. (For details ofALP policy on 
East Timor, adopted in July 1982, please see TAPOL Bulletin 
No.56, March 1983, page 8.) 
While on a visit to Jakarta in early June, Prime Minister 
Hawke announced that Australian defence aid to Indonesia, 
currently running at about A$10 million a year, would continue. 
This violates his party's policy which states that all defence aid to 
Indonesia should stop until Indonesian occupation troops have 
been withdrawn from East Tim or. He compounded the betrayal 
by declaring that in the interest of preserving relations with 
Indonesia "we should put E. Timor behind us" . 
Furthermore, though ALP policy categorically rejects the 
previous Australian government's recognition of the Indonesian 
takeover and supports self-determination for. E. Timor, which 
means supporting the UN resolution on E . Timor, Prime Minister 
Hawke has refused to commit his government to supporting the 
UN resolution later this year. (For the past four years, Australia 
has voted against the resolution, and last year lobbied heavily to 
pressure Pacific nations to vote with it.) On the resolution, Hawke 
insists that a final decision on Australia's vote can only be taken 
after an Australian Parliamentary delegation visits E . Timor in 
July, when it will be possible to hold an "informed debate" on the 
issue. 
Parliamentary visit seen as a 'concession' 
The decision by the Indonesian government to allow an 
Australian parliamentary delegation to visit E. Timor for three 
days during a ten-day visit to Indonesia was described by 
Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, as a 'concession' won 
from the Indonesian government during his visit to Jakarta in 
April. He claimed to have won other concessions, namely 
agreement to allow Australian Associated Press to set up an office 
in Jakarta - ending Indonesia's total rejection of the presence of 
any Australian journalists - and agreement to permit family re-
unification for Timorese whose families are now in Australia. 
Thus, the Australian government is trading concessions like 
these, which in fact are what Indonesia ought to have been doing 
all along, for ALP policy on the principle of self-determination. 
As for the parliamentary delegation's visit to E . Timor, it 
remains to be seen whether the team will be able to examine 
restricted and very brief examination of conditions in E. Timor 
cannot affect the question of self-determination one way or the 
other. Whatever the team sees, and it is hardly likely to get a 
chance to assess Timorese opposition to the Indonesian takeover, 
the question of E. Timor's right to self-determination remains a 
matter of principle. 
"Assessing the Cost" of ALP policy · '. . . 
Foreign Minister Bill Hayden told a group of E. T1mor act1V1sts 
who visited him in June to register their ptotest at any reversal of 
ALP policy, that by supporting the UN resolution on ~a~t Timor, 
Australian business interests stand to lose A$160 mtlhon. The 
Foreign Department had calculated this figure from losses Qantas 
Airways might suffer if Indonesia went ahead with threats to 
cancel Qantas flying rights to and through Indonesian air-space. 
Commercial shipping companies also stand to lose earnings if they 
are refused permission to sail to or through Indonesian waters. 
Gordon Bryant, formerly a minister in the Whitlam 
government, who was among those on the protest visit to Hayden, 
described as "provocative" any attempt by Indonesia to pressurise 
Australia over the way it votes at the UN. 
State ALP conferences discuss E. Timor 
The moves by Bob Hawke and Bill Hayden to renege on party 
policy about E. Timor came just as ALP state organisations were 
about to hold their annual conferences. Under the circumstances, 
E. Timor has become one of the major issues discussed in these 
conferences, with South Australia and Victoria vigorously 
supporting official policy and New South Wales supporting the 
government. 
One of the most outspoken ALP parliamentarians, Ken Fry, a 
long-standing supporter of self-determination in E. Timor, 
accused the Labour government of "sacrificing principle for 
expediency" and warned that the dispute now developing in the 
party could split it . Another Labour parliamentarian, Senator 
Gordon Mcintosh, who has been named as one of the five to visit 
E. Timor this month, was angry at suggestions made by PM 
Hawke that the delegation would return with a report favouring 
recognition . Senator Mcintosh, who is a member of the Senate 
Inquiry Committee on East Tim or, said the new Labour 
government was in danger of losing international credibility over 
its about-face. "Do we sweep 200,000 bodies under the carpet and 
accept Indonesia's idea that we continue this de jure recognition 
of their occupation?" 
Photos of Indonesian 
atrocities have just been 
received from East 
Timor. See also pages 
b,;;;:;;;;;;!!!'!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~""""llK!i!liiOl.i 13 and 16. 
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Bandung Youth and Student Group Exposes Manipulations of the Politician Generals 
ABRI MUST GET OUT OF POLITICS! 
A discussion group in Bandung, West Java, which includes a number of former students who led the 1978 movement of protest, issued a 
statement last year in response to the adoption of the Defence and Security Law passed by Parliament in September. As a political 
statement, it represents a new departure in outspoken criticism of the military regime. It summarises the step-by-step advance of 
militarisation and provides a useful guide to the present power structure of the "politician generals". 
The statement is now circulating in dissident circles in Indonesia, and has been sent abroad for publication. We reproduce it below, 
slightly abridged, as an important document on militarisation. The copy of the document received abroad bears altogether 31 
signatures. 
On 6th September 1982, Parliament adoptep a new law on 
basic provisions of State Defence and Security. The drafting and 
adoption of this Law took place with unusual haste and secrecy, 
and without hearing the opinions o.r proposals of many people. It 
includes the following provisions: 
• The Armed F.orces (ABRI) shall be the principal element in 
the national defence force, and shall at the same time be a 
social force . ,_: 
• ABRI shall be in charge of supervising all human and natural 
resources. 
• ABRI shall control the national infra- and super"stmctures, 
and shall do this by ensuring and safeguarding the efficient use 
of the mental and material infrastructure. 
• As the President's assistant in charge of implementing the 
"People's Defence Strategy" (HANRARI), the Minister of 
Defence shall determine the policy for implementing ABRI's 
role as a social force. 
• Working in .. collaboration with all other government 
departments, the Defence Department shall formulate and 
implement the HANRARI strategy in accordance with the 
policy already formulated. · ' 
• The Commander-in-Chief of ABRI shall be the President's 
assistant in exercising the powers of command of HANRARI. 
• ABRI shall be a political force, supervising social forces in 
accordance with its own doctrine in all domains of national life 
(ideolbgical, political, economic, social and cultural -
abbreviated tO IPOLEKSOSBUD). 
• ABRI shall be the authentic interpreter of the philosophy and 
world-view of the Indonesian nation in state affairs and defence 
strategy, and in identifying internal and external enemies. 
• In developing and maintaining HANRARI forces, a trained 
population shall be the basic component, ABRI the principal 
component, the protection of society a special component and 
the national resources a supportive component. 
• The new law replaces Defence Law 29/1954 as well as Law 13/ 
1963 on the Police Force: The most important change is the 
consolidation of ABRl's role as a sociai' force in the national 
defence and security system. 
* In March 1982, the Bandung Youth and Student Action 
Group issued an open call for "the exclusion of ABRI from 
politics", which made the following points: 
-that ABRI should dedi.cate itself only to the interests of the 
people and the state and should immediately end its 
involvement in social and political affairs; 
-that KOPKAMTIB, a non-constitutional body, should be 
abolished; , 
-that ABRI should be freed from the misconduct of the 
politician generals who have, in the eyes of the Indonesian 
peopfe, tarnished ABRl's image, its unity wjth the people and 
its authority and respect. 
It is very clear that the new law is nothing less than a move to 
leg~Iise ABRI's continued interference in political affairs: This . 
not only represents aknowledgement in theory of ABRI's dual . 
function; it goes so far as to legitimise ABRI's Multi-Function 
in Indonesian state affairs. This Group therefore . wishes to 
make known its opinion of this law, with particular attention to 
the following : 
tt~ft'tttt 
I. THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE POLITICIAN 
GENERALS 
In developing their role, the political generals have exploited 
ABRI for their own purposes so as to secure a political position, 
with the result that ABRI no longer serves the people's interests. 
The steps taken have included the following: 
Under the 1945 Constitution, ABRI should occupy a neutral 
position as a national defence force, serving the interests of the 
majority; it should not become a social and political force. When 
Law no: 3 was adopted in 1948, streamlining military 
organisation, some politician generals opposed this; so as to 
secure a political position. Their ploy reached a climax with the 
coup attempt of October 1952 which failed to get Parliament 
dissolved. 
In March 1957, the President declared a state of war and set up 
a National Council in May that year as the supreme body of the 
state. The politician generals brought ABRI into the Council with 
the result that it was no longer neutral. These same men were 
responsible for getting ABRI acknowledged as a functional body 
so that it could be represented in Parliament. 
On 12th November 1958, the same generals devised a 'middle-
road policy', seeking positions in the political domain, in 
government and in Parliament, As a result, on 23rd November 
1958, the National Council acknowledged ABRI as a functional 
body thus ensuring it a role in Parliament. This led to the 
formulation of ABRl's Tri Ubaya Sakti Doctrine, also known as 
ABRI's Dual-Function Doctrine. 
With the pronouncement of the 5th July 1959 Presidential 
Decree, ABRI automatically became a non-neutral political 
force, thus confirming its position as a functional group in 
Parliament. As a functional group with political clout, ABRI then 
set up the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat 
Bersama Golongan Kary'a) on 20th October 1964. 
When, after the events of 30th September 1965, Suharto 
replaced Sukarno as President, on behalf of those in power in 
ABRI, the greater part of ABRI's efforts to secure political 
authority in government had been accomplished. 
In 1966, these politician generals succeeded in forcing the 
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People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to adopt TAP 24/1966 
[TAP is the designation for MPR decisions] which recognised 
ABRI as a system of both material and technological as well as 
political might. Then General Suharto engaged in horse-trading 
with the political parties, insisting that ABRI get an allocation of a 
hundred seats in Parliament; the parties gained nothing in return. 
Furthermore, the President was granted the right to appoint one-
third of the members of the MPR. This was called the 'National 
Consensus' which was later pushed through as another TAP. 
In 1971, Golongan Karya (GOLKAR), the mouthpiece of the 
politician generals, contested and won the general elections by 
trickery. Then General Suharto pushed Parliament into adopting 
a law simplifying the political parties which enhanced the political 
clout of GOLKAR by ensuring implementation of a number of 
regulations: Interior Minister RegulatiOn No. 12, 1969 which 
prevents GOLKAR people in regional assemblies from joining 
political parties; Government Regulation No. 6, 1970 which 
prevents members of ABRI and civil servants from joining 
political parties; and Law No. 3, 1975 concerning the 'floating 
masses'. 
In 1978, after winning the 1977 general election, the same 
group pushed the MPR into adopting TAP No. 4 which confirmed 
ABRI as both a defence and a social force. As a result, political 
affairs had fallen completely into the hands of the politician 
generals who were then easily able to utilise the entire ABRI 
network for the purpose of safeguarding their political interests. 
This secured victory for them in the 1982 elections so as to 
perpetuate the position of General Suharto and his confederate 
politician generals. Then, in September 1982, Parliament was 
driven into adopting the Defence Law which not merely confirms 
ABRI as a defence and social force; ABRI has emerged as an 
absolute power with its claws wrapped firmly around the Republic 
of Indonesia. This Law transformed ABRI's Dual Function into 
the Multi-Function of A.BRI, which means the supremacy of 
ABRI. 
~~ttttkt 
II. THE PRESENT ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURE OF ABRI 
As the political role of ABRI has evolved under the politician 
generals, so has its organisation structure changed. ABRI has 
become the political force within GOLKAR as is evident from the 
functional principles of ABRI. It has been incorporated into the 
GOLKAR fraternity, alongside civil servants and other 
functional or professional groupings. 
Each Territorial Defence Commander (KOWILHAN) assists 
the President as special executive officer of KOPKAMTIB (the 
Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and 
Order) in his territory (Presidential Decision No 9, 1974). 
The President has placed the Provincial Defence Commands 
(KODAM) under the command of the KOWILHAN 
Commanders who are empowered to formulate political policy 
together with the President (Presidential Decision No. 79, 1969/ 
70). 
The President is Supreme Commander of ABRI; the position 
of individual Force commanders has been abolished and they 
have been reduced to chiefs-of-staff of the Forces. Operational 
duties have been transferred to the Minister for Defence and 
Security who is also answerable to the President (Presidential 
Decision No. 79, 1969 and the 1982 Defence Law). 
KOWILHAN commanders exercise authority over all the 
constituent arms of the forces in the regions, over joint 
commands, special joint commands and special-operations units. 
The KOWILHAN commanders are also chairmen of the 
ABRI Functionaries' Councils which supervise ABRI personnel 
who occupy civil or political positions so as to control national 
policy. They also co-ordinate the Provincial Leadership Teams 
which are known as the MUSPIDA (combining civil, military and 
police chiefs). 
KOPKAMTIB is a non-constitutional body which perpetuates 
the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963, and it has unlimited powers to 
carry out repressive measures against any individual, group or 
body which incurs the disfavour of the politician generals. 
(Details of other ABRI organisms are given in Appendix I.) 
ttttttt; 
III. THE POWER OF THE POLITICIAN 
GENERALS 
With TAP No. 4 in force legalising ABRI's role as a social force in 
addition to being a defence force, the Dual-Function came to 
fruition. Then, the KOWILHANs were set up, with the Defence 
Ministry in charge of formulating ABRI's policy as a social and 
political force. As a result, various critical positions in 
government and other institutions are filled by politician generals, 
including the position of president and many ministerial positions, 
as well as top positions in other supreme state organs and 
agencies. 
A complete list of positions occupied by ARRI personnel is given. It 
is excluded here for reasons of space. 
IV. GOLKAR AS THE TOOL OF THE POLITICIAN 
GENERALS, AND THEIR POLITICAL 
MANCEUVRING TO CONTROL OTHER 
POLITICAL SPHERES 
Golongan Karya was created by the politician generals as their 
political front; it grew out of the Sekretariat Bersama Golongan 
Karya setup in 1964. GOLKAR is the base from which ABRI has 
enhanced its political role and represents realisation of the 1978 
TAP which defined ABRI as a social force. The politician 
generals have manipulated GOLKAR as their political tool to 
support their interests and positions. 
The main organs in GOLKAR are the Advisory Council 
(Dewan Pembina) the Central Advisory Council and Fraksi 
Karya, GOLKAR's grouping in Parliament. The Dewan 
Pembina is the key body; its members include the President, 
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Development Cabinet 198~1988 
cabinet ministers and representatives of GOLKAR Units, 
including ABRI. As for the key positions within GOLKAR, 
ABRI occupies all the top slots in the three organs mentioned 
above. Since the Dewan Pembina also includes qtbinet ministers, 
state policy, including defence and security · as well as all 
government affairs, are firmly in GOLKAR hands. Everything is 
ultimately determined by the chairman of the Dewan Pembina, 
General (retired) Suharto as president of the Republic. The 
Dewan's role at the GOLKAR National Conference is crucial, 
and moreover it has the power to convene national consultations 
which is tantamount to giving it the right of veto. 
As for the power of the politician generals to steamroll their 
wishes through Parliament and the MPR, it should be stated that 
the two political parties - PPP (Muslim) and PDI (Nationalist 
and Christian) - have to try to match their forces against the 
Fraksi Karya and the ABRI Fraksi, both of which are tools of the 
politician generals. GOLKAR unfailingly wins general elections 
because of the various regulations mentioned above; these 
regulations have been directed specifically against the political 
parties. 
Every single law enacted since 1966 has been adopted on the 
orders.of the politician generals because Parliament has since then 
been under their control. Since the MPR consists of all the 
members of Parliament plus regional delegates and groups 
appointed by General Suharto (empowered, as he is, to appoint a 
third of the members of the MPR), it is clear that MPR decisions 
reflect the wishes of the politician generals. Thus, political power 
is concentrated in their hands. To summarise, the politician 
generals have placed Parliament and the MPR under the control 
of Suharto and his confederates, won the elections by deceit, 
fractionalised the social and political forces, and succeeded, by 
means of the General Elections Law, in driving the political 
parties into a corner. They have succeeded in occupying key 
positions in government and the state, in monopolising the 
appointment of officials, and dismissing any officials oppo'sed to 
the politician generals. They have abolished people's 
participation through the 'floating masses' policy, by threatening 
people against joining parties, by prohibiting political activity by 
students and workers, by combatting ideology and religion as 
political principles, by carrying out compulsory indoctrination of 
citizens and intimidating civil servants into participating in 
indoctrination courses, by exploiting the bureaucracy and the 
security apparatus in order to perpetuate their own power, and by 
preserving KOPKAMTIB in violation of basic civil rights. They 
have also abused ABRI by using it as a tool to eradicate elements 
t,mdesirable to the politician generals, using such methods as 
torture, intimidation, interrogation, imprisonment and other 
forms of military operations. 
V. THE POLITICIAN GENERALS' 
INVOLVEMENT IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
Thanks to their unlimited powers - free from the control of the 
people - the politician generals have also exploited their 
positions to promote personal economic interests. The powers 
vested in them enable them to make Jaws, and to issue 
presidential decrees, directives and instructions, government 
regulations, ministerial regulations and decisions, bank credit 
authorisations, import and export licences, rights and franchises 
for businessmen, exclusive rights and so on . These powers have 
been misused to serve the economic advancement of companies 
controlled by the politician generals either in their own name or 
on behalf of members of their families, their military units, 
departments or cronies. All this stems from the fact that economic 
measures adopted by them in relation to ownership and policy 
invariably favour their own companies. The ones to gain from 
their policies are the generals' supporters, cronies and immediate 
family members. Import and export licences, rights, franchises, 
exclusive rights and licences for foreign capital investment are all 
awarded for the benefit of companies owned by the politician 
generals. 
The Foreign Investment Law of 1967 granted tax and import 
duty concessions to foreign companies. These facilities have been 
used as a device to establish cooperation between foreign 
companies and the generals. It comes as no suprise that all foreign 
capital investment is dominated by such cooperation. Up to 1973, 
the Foreign Investment Law was highly favourable to foreign 
entrepeneurs who secured the following percent~ge share in 
business sectors: agriculture and fisheries, 33.5%; forestry, 
59.3%; infrastructure, 75% ; construction, 19%; mining, 96%; 
industry, 35%; hotels and tourism, 47% ; real estate, 32%. 
Bureaucratic authority has also been exploited to raise tactical 
funds for the political activities of organisations such as 
GOLKAR. 
As President, General Suharto also takes decisions allowing 
only the giant companies, most of which are owned by the 
politician generals, to run projects valued in excess of 500 million 
rupiahs (Presidential Decision No 10, 1980) . 
Economic policy in general has no regard any more for the vast 
majority of the population. Economic development is heavily 
oriented towards growth and is not based on national resources. 
'Equitable distribution' is a rhetoric used to build up a capitalist 
economic system. 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
ABRI has been abused by the politician generals in order to 
secure political and economic positions. 
ABRI represents a non-neutral defence and security force with 
political power concentrated in the hands of General Suharto. 
All positions in government and state, whether in the cabinet, 
the state institutions, further education institutes and so on, have 
been exploited by the politician generals, with the result that 
General Suharto's power is virtually absolute. 
GOLKAR is the political tool of General Suharto and the 
other politician generals and is used to support their authority. 
All sectors of the economy are under the control of the 
politician generals along with big entrepreneurs, non-indigenous 
and foreign, who are together creating a capitalist economic 
system. 
Political and economic policy serve only to bolster the position 
and aims of General Suharto and his confederates. 
For these reasons, the new Defence Law represents a device to 
expand and perpetuate the absolute power in the political and 
economic spheres of General Suharto and his confederates, who 
are thus jeopardising the future of the nation and the state while at 
Continued on next page 
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Ex-KOPKAMTIB commander takes control of labour 
Since becoming Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, former 
commander of KOPKAMTIB , has proven to .be one of the most 
active ministers. "Hardly a day passes," reports Tempo , "without 
something about him being reported in the press." 
When he shifted jobs, Sudomo took with him most of his top-
level staff from KOPKAMTIB, reinforcing predictions that the 
style of labour control developed by the security command would 
now characterise operations of the Department of Labour. 
Sudomo's moves to introduce far more effective management of 
the Jabour force have included: 
** the re-opening of government Jabour exchanges for the 
registration and supervision of the unemployed; 
** streamlining departmental monitoring of the labour force and 
industrial disputes; 
** the promise to set up a number of new vocational training 
centres; 
** warnings that if the government-sponsored union, FBSI fails 
to prevent strikes by unions under its wing, it could be 
disbanded; 
** hints that existing Jabour Jaws which reflect 'liberal 
democratic tendencies' are soon to be revised . . 
** a declaration that the word buruh may no longer be used for 
'worker' because of its 'class connotations' and that pekerja or 
karyawan must be used instead; 
** a hint at the suspension of collective bargaining, to be 
replaced by tripartite negotiations which incorporate the 
government/security apparatus into the process . 
Many of the ideas being promoted by Sudomo are in fact a 
continuation of the policy he launched at KOPKAMTIB , centred 
chiefly round the setting up of special teams in the regions to 
monitor and intervene in industrial disputes in order to forestall 
the outbreak of strikes, and to involve the army directly in these 
teams . In fact, 'tripartite councils' was a term already in use for 
some of these teams last year. According to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review view, some foreign observers have warned that 
"any mishandling of the labour unions by Sudomo would invite 
Continued from page 11 
the same time acting in violation of the 1945 Constitution. 
VII DECLARATION 
We the undersigned: 
1. Declare that we do not recognise the legitimacy of the Defence 
and Security Law and for this reason reject its enforcement within 
the Republic. 
2. Declare that the armed forces of a ·democratic state must not 
under any circumstances interfere with the politics of that state. 
The role of all politician generals in politics must therefore be 
immediately brought to an end. 
3. Condemn attempts to divert ABRI from its exclusivefonction 
as the instrument of defence of the state. 
4.- Insist that the defence of the state be organised in accordance 
with the 1945 Constitution. 
Bandung, 10th September 1983. 
APPENDIX I 
I. Other organisms set up to reinforce the political position of 
the generals: 
- National Defence Institute (LEHMANNAS): cultivates on a 
national scale the concept of ABRl's political role as an integral 
part of the national defence effort .. 
- SESKO-ABRI: the education of senior ABRI officers 
strong reaction particularly from international labour federations 
and Western labour party governments .-" . 
All sources confirm that there has been a marked rise in · 
militancy among the workforce, largely in response to the sharp · 
fall in real wages ; FBSI chairman, Agus Sudono recently declared 
that a 14% rise in wages would be needed to c9mpensate wage-
earners for the effect of the cut in oil subsidies last January and the 
rupiah devaluation in March. 
Sources: Tempo, 14 May , FEER 30 June and March 1983 Update 
of Indonesian Workers and their Right to Organise (INDOC). 
Labour Minister Tells Employers to 
Ignore Labour Laws 
The Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, has publicly 
told employers that they need not comply with labour Jaws 
if this proves profitable to them. 'Our labour laws do n_ot 
h~ve to be rigidly adhered to, he said. Some exiunples of 
Jaws that could be ignored were those concerning the 
minimum age (which would open the way to officfally 
sanctioned employment of child labour} and those 
concerning the number of working hours. (Tempo, 9th July 
1983) 
Even without such encouragement from the Minister, 
many employe:rs already ignore the labour laws. But for 
Sudomo to have made the point publicly can only mean that 
he is in the process of _ making preparations for a 
comprehensive overhaul of Indonesia's labour laws. He has 
already given this impression by remarks . suggesting that 
the Jaws are •outmoded' and reflect 'liberal-democratic 
tendencies' . 
Sudomo has also announced that judges should now sit 
on the regional and ce'ntral labour arbitration boards, even 
though this would infnnge the legal provisions governing 
the composition of these boards. 
especially with an eye to the formation of cadres for the political 
supervision of ABRI. · _ _ 
- Institute of ABRI History: for the purpose of manipulating 
historical data in order to provide support for ABRl's role in 
politics. . 
- Other organisms such as charitable foundations, legions, 
communication forums, cooperative agencies , and mass 
organisations. 
- Special Operations (OPSUS): functions according to need. 
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The situation in East Timor today 
Neobere, an East Timorese who left Dili in January this year and is now living as a refugee in Portugal, spent three years fighting with 
the resistance. Until his capture in November 1978, he gained wide experience of the conditions under which people fought against the 
Indonesian occupation, in particular the devastating bombardments by Indonesian aircraft and naval vessels, causing a huge loss of life. 
After spending several months as a captive with an Indonesian military unit in the south eastern region of Matebian, he escaped to Dili 
and remained there until his departure for Lisbon this year. 
On a visit to London in May, Neobere was interviewed at length by T APOL. Part of this interview, dealing with the current 
situation, is published below. The rest of the interview, dealing with the resistance period, will be published in the next issue ofTAPOL 
Bulletin. 
We have heard how the Indonesian occupation forces set up 
strategic centres for the Timorese forced down from the mountains 
by the heavy bombardment. Can you describe them? 
The places to which people were driven were centred around 
the Postes, the administrative centres that existed during 
Portuguese colonial times. People are not free in these centres; 
they live in a state of constant fear, knowing that if they were to try 
to leave arid were then caught by Indonesian soldiers, they could 
be shot dead. Women have been caught, detained and tortured 
for this; the soldiers try to force them to say they wanted to make 
contact with Fretilin (the resistance movement). Then the women 
are brutally tortured - with cigarette burns on the breast or 
sexual organs. It is difficult to find words to describe the 
barbarous methods used by Indonesian troops against Timorese 
women; and these things are still happening today. Some people 
who try to leave the centres are shot dead, and the soldiers then 
say they thought they had seen a 'wild boar' and shot it . 
What about the activities of the Catholic Relief Services which has 
distributed food relief aid intended for people in these centres? We 
understand you have some experience of the CRS because you 
worked for them for a while. 
My experience with the CRS dates from 1980 when I started 
working for them in Dili. What I know is that when they took food 
to the strategic centres and wanted to distribute it direct to the 
population, they were always prevented from doing so by the 
military. The local officers from the Koramil{sub-district military 
command) never allow food to be distributed by anyone but 
themselves. Then what they do is to hand out very small quantities 
of food, just a glass of cornflour, for example, and keep most of 
the relief food for themselves, to sell it for profit or to use it to 
force Timorese people to collaborate with them. CRS and other 
food aid can only be distributed in this way. 
When the CRS first started relief operations, they compared 
conditions to those in Kampuchea and Biafra. What are your own 
impressions of conditions when the centres were first set up, in 
1979? 
Conditions were extremely bad though of course I can't make 
comparisons with those other places. I saw many cases of extreme 
malnutrition and witnessed terrible scenes. People often 
wandered in search of food. I remember seeing someone (I was in 
Matebian at the time) who had found an edible root. When 
someone else tried to take it from him, the first man started 
running away, but after running about 10 metres, he fell down 
dead. I often saw people trying to walk, then falling and dying on 
the spot. Sometimes people just made it to an Army post, then 
dropped dead because they were starving. I can't give figures, but 
certainly huge numbers of people died of starvation. 
But you should realise that these things are still happening 
today. Conditions haven't really improved much. People are still 
dying for lack of food, for instance in Uatocarabau, Laga and 
elsewhere. It's not difficult to see such things. If opservers go to 
these places, they will see it for themselves: many people are just 
skin and bones. 
We often receive reports about famine, but observers are not able 
to go and see for themselves. Only last month, an Australian 
journalist, John Hamilton, writing for the West Australian, gave a 
glowing report of conditions in E. Timor, saying he saw no c:ases of 
famine at all. 
Of course, you are right. It's extremely difficult to produce 
evidence of famine conditions because the places where it exists 
are controlled by the Indonesians, and they will try to prevent 
anyone from finding out . But any journalist who is genuinely keen 
to get a balanced picture of conditions can surely do so even if the 
Indonesians confine them to very restricted areas. It's quite 
certain that some of these journalists have been bought over by 
the Indonesians; they're prepared to accept whatever the 
Indonesians tell them as the truth. If a journalist knows the places 
where severe deprivation is occurring, he or she should find ways 
of discovering the truth. 
What's your own estimate of the number of deaths in E. Timor 
since the Indonesian invasion? 
I think the estimate of a third of the population is fairly 
accurate. But I want to stress that even now, with the population 
concentrated in the so-called settlements, people are still dyingjn 
considerable numbers. 
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Mario Carrascalao, Governor of E. Timor, said recently that most 
of the deaths occurred in August and September 1975, at the time 
.of the civil war. What is your comment? 
It's blatantly untrue to claim that many people died during the 
fighting between Fretilin and the UDT. The only weapons both 
sides had were 03 rifles and Mausers. How could they possibly 
have killed so many people? It's utter nonsense. I travelled 
extensively throughout the country from 1976-78, while I was with 
the resistance, and I know it to be absolutely true that most of the 
people who died, died as a result of the bombings by sea and by 
air. Another reason for many of the deaths is the fact that when 
the Indonesians invaded, people fled to the mountains and few 
remained in the lowlands, so very little food was produced there. 
When the people were forcedoack down from the mountains, 
there was hardly any food being produced there, and the 
Indonesians provided absolutely nothing in the way of food : 
There was nothing to eat, which is why so many died from 
starvation. And epidemics spread among the hungry people who 
had no resistance. Many died of a gastric ailment of epidemic 
proportions which caused violent diarrhoea. This spread 
throughout the country. People were so feeble, and there was no 
proper sanitation: resistance to such ailments was very low. If, 
under conditions of peace, people could go to places where such 
things happened, they would see evidence of what I am saying. 
But the Indonesians are still killing many people in the 
settlements. They regard every Timorese as a Fretilin supporter, 
so from time to time they round them up. Of course, most people 
aren't directly involved in any fighting, but because they can see 
how people suffer under the Indonesians, they are very 
sympathetic to the struggle. They have no arms, but they support 
the struggle, which is why the Indonesians set about decimating 
people. If they go on like they are doing now, there soon won't be 
any Timorese people left. It's not a question of how many people 
died in the past; people are still dying today. 
I know of some inddents that occurred just before I left E. 
Timor. In one case, in Vemasse, a place on the road to Manututu, 
a teacher was killed. Then a primary school teacher, Jose Viegas, 
was murdered because he was suspected of being a member of 
Fretilin. He was taken from his home late at night with three other 
men, two of whom were nurses. Relatives managed to rescue the 
other three but the teacher was lost. His wife and father-in-law are 
still in Vemasse, so this report can be checked with them. The 
other three managed to escape to Dili, then they were arrested 
there, and are being kept under surveillance. Another incident I 
know of happened in Venilale, in the eastern central region of 
Viqueque. The man in question was Joao Brito who had been 
summoned by the military. When he returned home, his wife told 
him soldiers had come to the house and tried to rape her; she 
struggled and prevented this from happening. Brito went back to 
the military command and complained that the officer had 
allowed bis men to do such a thing. He got very angry and 
attacked the officer. The other soldiers saw this, so late that night, 
they went back to Brito's home, took him away and killed him. 
What are the main causes for the continuing starvation and the 
possibility of famines? 
Formerly Timorese people cultivated a great deal of land. 
They produced enough to sell part of their crops so as to buy the 
things they needed, and could consume the rest of their crop. 
Now, confined to the settlements, they can only cultivate very tiny 
plots of land; they don't even have enough for their own 
consumption lc!t alone anything left over to sell. Added to that, 
the people have lost most of their possessions; they have no 
wealth and can't buy anything. 
The food supplied by foreign relief agencies is distributed by 
the army. They give it out in very small portions, about 300 grams 
for a family. A lot of the food intended for relief is sold by the 
soldiers, but most Timorese don't have the money to buy it. When 
people are very hungry, the army uses the food to 'buy' 
collaboration. I once joined a queue for food - flour from 
America with vitamins added. But the portion I got was so small, 
it wasn't even enough for a meal for the family. All we could do 
was mix it with water and drink it. It was never the custom for 
Timorese people to tell others of their . difficulties, to talk about 
how hungry they were, but now they have to do if, they even have 
to beg for food . 
Strategic Settlements and Land Shortage 
An American professor, Donald E. Weatherbee, . who 
visited E . Timor in 1980 and subsequently published 
reports wholly favourable to Indonesian annexation, 
nevertheless warned of the consequences of land shortage 
which Neobere so graphically describes. He wrote: 
"There is a basic problem that will not be easily 
overcome. The agricultural foundation ~f these large 
resettlement.centres is inadequate to provide for them. The 
restrictions imposed on access to land away from the 
centres means that larger populations have to be supported 
on less land. . 
"The situation in Quelicai is illustrative of tpe problem in 
the east and south. Most of the people came down from the 
mountains in October, 1978. They are only able to work 
fields that can be reached and returned from in a single day. 
There is no fertiliser. Rodents destroy a substantial 
percentage of the. crops in the fields. There is no regular 
water supply and they are who1ly dependent on rainf~ll. 
The land they are working cannot supply the population, 
but they are not permitted to move out to open up qther 
land. In 1979, and now, the deficit is partially made up by 
CRS feedings, distributed through the Catholic pastor. As 
CRS and ICRC phase out their programs, however, what 
will happen? When I asked a lurah desa (village head) that, 
his answer was: "I don't know. The KODIM* will help us." 
"Flying over East Timor by helicopter, one is impressed 
by the thousands of acres of fields - for corn, dry rice, wet 
rice, and pasture - now going back to waste: land whose 
utilisation was ab~olutely essential to support the 
population at a minimal sub.sistence level of existence." 
From: "The Situation in East Timor" by Donald E. 
Weatherbee, Institute of International Studies, University 
of South Carolina n980). 
*KO DIM: District Military Command. 
It's not true to say that Timorese aren't producing food any 
more, but they produce very little indeed. Because of this, they 
face the prospect of famine. Such crops as maize, rice and 
coconuts used to be widely produced in the east but now they're 
produced only in very small quantities. This is firstly because the 
Indonesians have destroyed so much land and driven people from 
their land. And many coconut trees have been destroyed too. In 
the west, coffee was the main crop, but now coffee growers are not 
allowed to sell their produce to traders on the free market. They 
have to sell it to Indonesians at ridiculously low prices, and fear 
very much what could happen if they refused to sell it to them. 
They could get killed for this. In Portuguese days, the Chinese 
were the ones who came round and bought the coffee; the 
peasants could bargain to get a good price. Nowadays, food-crop 
producers have nothing to sell, whereas coffee-growers are 
compelled to sell to the Indonesians. 
The problem is that people have been uprooted from their 
traditional practices and from their traditional lands. Where they 
are now, they can till very little land, the land isn't fertile and it's a 
different kind of soil from what they know. In the mountains, 
there wasn't any need to use fertilisers. The land they cultivate 
now is not 1only very restricted; it's also not fertile~ 
Shifting agriculture was widespread in former days, wasn't it? Do 
you think the Indonesians have forced people to stay in the strategic 
areas because of the military's preference for settled communities, 
and because shifting agriculture makes it more difficult to control 
people? 
No, that isn't the rationale behind Indonesian policy. The main 
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reason why they have forced people to resettle around these 
former Portuguese Postes is to prevent them from moving around 
and coming in contact with the resistance. Once the population is 
under control, it isn't possible for them to go far. The troops then 
consider that security can be safeguarded in this way, and no 
contact with Fretilin is possible. Of course, this policy disrupts 
agricultural methods and traditions, but the chief reason is the 
security consideration. 
Which parts of the country are now under Fretilin control? 
Actually, Indonesian control is really only limited to the towns 
and settlements . People are not permitted to go more than 15 
kilometres or so from these places. Anyone going farther is 
accused of trying to contact Fretilin to bring them letters or 
supplies of medicine. People get arrested and tortured for this; 
many of those who are now in Atauro were captured for doing this 
kind of thing. 
When we were in the bush there was no food shortage; there 
was always plenty of food . One of the reasons why the resistance 
in the mountains could last so long was the favourable food 
situation. There was always plenty of fruit, bananas, coconuts, 
potatoes and so on. The soil there is very fertile. 
What happens when foreign visitors come to E. Timor? Do people 
there know about these visits and try to make contact? 
It's very difficult to find out things like that, though word does 
get around. All foreign visitors have to stay at Resende Hotel. 
This hotel is situated at a crossroads in Dili and there are military 
police guarding the junction at all four corners. Just across the 
road from the hotel there is a police station so they can control 
everything. It is very easy for the Indonesians to see who goes in 
and out of the hotd, so people don't dare go there because it's too 
risky. 
Could you tell us something about the attitude of Indonesian 
soldiers in E. Timor? 
The army has been fighting there for about seven years without 
achieving the victory they hoped for. Many of the troops have 
become frustrated and they often go berserk out of revenge. 
When this happens, any woman they find is tortured. There was 
the case of a pregnant woman whose body was completely 
disembowelled and her head was smashed against a wall; this 
incident occurred in Aitama. That's a particular incident I know 
about, but things like that often happen. 
What about the composition of the urban population? Has there 
been a big influx from Indonesia? The authorities talk about 
agricultural projects they say have been set up. Who is working on 
these projects? 
The Indonesians have been bringing people in from 
everywhere. As for Dili, many newcomers have been brought in. 
In Maliana (in the west, near the border with West Timor), 200 
families have been brought from Indonesia to 'fill the gap', as they 
say, in the population. This is their tactic, to show the world that 
the population level is being maintained, but what people don't 
know is that many people are not Timorese but Indonesians. 
Many of the newcomers have come of their own will, but those in 
Maliana were bn:~ught in by the government. That happened not 
long ago, altogether about 200 families. Recently there were 
reports of groups being taken to other regions, though I don't 
know the exact amounts. And just before I left, I heard that the 
government is planning to populate the plains of Oelaluhu and 
Matubore on the south coast with transmigrants. Transmigrants 
are given plots of land and facilities to settle down. These are 
people who don't come of their own free will, vagrants, 
unemployed or landless people who are picked up and brought to 
populate regions in E. Timor. 
The occupying forces claim now that there are 90,000 to 100,000 
children at school. Do you think that is true? 
I can't confirm or deny that figure, but it sounds a great 
exaggeration to me. There are so many children outside the main 
( ' 
towns who are very unlikely to be at school. It can't really be in the 
interest of the colonisers to educate our people. They may well 
have set up some primary schools but they really don't have the 
means to set up secondary schools. I'm sure those figures are just 
for propaganda purposes . 
Besides that , so many people who got good education under 
the Portuguese and are very well qualified can't get jobs. I myself 
am a qualified professional but I couldn't get a paid job for years. 
Is there discrimination against Timorese in employment? 
Yes, and it's very widespread. Nurses who formerly worked 
for the Portuguese administration were kept on but at minimal 
salaries, only 15,000 rupiahs a month. But male nurses brought in 
from Indonesia receive 200,000 rupiahs a month. It's the same in 
other professions too. Many Timorese (including me) were 
employed up to 1981 without any pay at all. This very low pay is a 
cause of great frustration: if people refuse to work for such a 
salary they are accused of refusing to collaborate and supporting 
Fretilin and for this they can be sent to prison. There are many 
graduates from the Catholic seminaries · - very well-educated 
men with a high proficiency in languages - who simply can't get 
jobs. 
Who are the teachers in the schools? 
Almost all are Indonesians, and of course they teach in 
Indonesian. The percentage of Timorese teachers is very small; 
they get what's called a 'premium' of 45,000 a moqth but the 
Indonesian teachers get 70,000 or 75 ,000 rupiahs. But you know, 
there are still some Timorese working in government offices who 
aren't paid anything at all. They are forced to work like this; if 
they refuse, they're accused of being pro-Fretilin which means 
they could be arrested. To make ends meet, these people try to 
cultivate tiny plots of land , but they're not allowed to go far afield 
to do this; if they did, they would be accused of trying to contact 
the resistance. 
What about Fretilin people who have been detained then released? 
Are they under surveillance? 
Yes. The Indonesians impose a system of so-called 
indoctrination on those who have come down from the 
mountains. As part of this, they are required to work, mostly very 
menial tasks , without pay, and live in semi-freedom. 
Would you say that there are any schools in the villages? 
What I must stress is that villages as we knew them before the 
invasion simply don't exist any more. All village life has stopped. 
Everyone has been brought together in the settlements, around 
the Postes. Just to explain the difference, I should explain that 
before the invasion, there was the capital (Dili) and some 
medium-sized towns, and then the small towns or 'Postes'. These 
Postes were the administrative centre of large areas which 
included many widely scattered villages. But now, the villages 
have ceased to exist, and the people are all required to live around 
the Postes. · 
Aren't there any villages at all in the mountains? 
If you talk about the mountains, what I must stress is that is it 
very dangerous for people to go there because those are the areas 
where Fretilin is still active. If the Indonesians find anyone in the 
mountains they can immediately be arrested or killed. That's why 
no-one ventures into the mountains. 
I'm afraid I must be conveying a very pessimistic and sad 
picture. I only wish I could speak more optimistically, but these 
are the realities. I can't invent things that don't exist. Sure, a lot of 
roads have been built around Dili, and a lot of new buildings have 
gone up, but the development the Indonesians talk about is 
nothing more, so I really can't speak of any improvements. I can't 
invent things. 
We have heard reports that prisoners on Atauro are now being 
moved away. Is this true? 
Yes, indeed, some have been moved away, according to the 
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'gravity' of their 'case'. Some of these people never re-appear; no-
one knows what happened to them. 
Some reports speak about Atauro prisoners being sent back to a 
place near Maliana. Can you tell us about this? 
Many of these transfers take place in preparation for visits to 
Atauro by journalists, to make sure the journalists don't meet 
them. In Maliana, they are kept under strict surveillance, in a 
concentration camp. Atauro being an island surrounded by sea 
can easily be controlled by a small number of men, but in Maliana 
the prisoners are confined to one place. These transfers are part of 
an Indonesian stratagem to convince people that prisoners on 
Atauro are being released. The fact is though that they're still 
under detention . 
There have been reports of prisoners being disposed of by being 
thrown out of helicopters. What do you know about this? 
The Indonesian military often take Fretilin prisoners by 
helicopter to various parts of the country on propaganda trips. 
They call meetings of local people to tell them how bad Fretilin is 
and good Indonesia is. After such propaganda meetings, many of 
these prisoners are exterminated. One favourite method of 
disposing of prisoners is that they are taken to a coastal region 
known as a pasto/, where there are several sea inlets or small bays. 
The prisoners are horribly beaten up and tortured. Some of them 
are even skinned and decapitated. The bodies are then left in the 
shallow sea, tied to heavy rocks to prevent them from floating 
away. Of course, there is a great deal of blood which discolours 
the sea-water. One place where this happened very frequently is a 
coastal region known as Areia Branca or White Sands. It's 
situated along the coast, not far from Dili. It's why this place came 
to be called the 'sea of blood'. I should add that most of the people 
disp0sed of in this way had been taken from Comarca prison in 
Dili. It happened a great deal up to 1981, but less so since then 
because the Bishop and the priests have been on the lookout, so 
the Indonesians have developed other ways of exterminating 
peopte. 
What methods of torture do the troops use in E. Timor? 
I should first explain that I myself was never tortured, except 
for a heavy beating I got while I was still detained by a military unit 
in Matebian. Women are tortured with cigarette burns on the 
breasts and genitals. Electric shock is widely used. People are 
badly beaten up. Their hands are placed under chair-legs then the 
torturers stand on the chairs. 
What about water torture, or water-cells? 
Yes, that is a method used. In Dili prison, they use bath-tubs 
full of water. The water is full of dangerous insects, human 
excrement and urine and other very unpleasant things. The 
prisoner is forced to remain in the tub for a long period, until he 
confesses. The RPKAD (paratroops) unit has a special torture . 
centre in Dili, in a place called Mandarin. Many people have 
disappeared from there. 
Would you explain how the general elections were conducted in E. 
Timor in May last year? 
Long before polling day, the government sent military officers 
out to all areas to tell people that they had to take part in the 
election, and that they must vote for GOLKAR, not for either of 
the other parties. I myself attended such a meeting where a soldier 
told us how we must vote. We were told that if we didn't vote, we 
would be branded as Fretilin. This meant that voting was 
compulsory. So our people thought: well, if we have to vote, we 
shall try to do it not in the way they want, so as not to give the 
impression that they have the support of the Timorese. But the 
point is that people felt they had to. vote, otherwise they could be 
killed. 
At the polling stations, there were three ballot boxes, one for 
each of the parties. The GOLKAR box was in the middle (No.2) 
and the PPP and PDI boxes were on each side. In front of where 
the polling booth was there was a small hall with military police on 
guard. The three boxes were concealed behind a curtain but the 
curtain didn't come down to the floor, only to knee height, so the 
guard could see, by watching people's feet, which box they went 
to. People knew what was happening, so they tried to keep their 
feet in front of the middle box but put their voting slip into one of 
the other boxes. 
What about the birth control programme in E. Timor. A 
Portuguese TV journalist who visited there in February has 
written that the objective is 'to reduce hardship' and prevent 
'overpopulation'. He also wrote about the use of Depo Provera 
injections, a method that is widely criticised and opposed in many 
countries. Please tell us everything you know about this. 
This birth control programme is strongly opposed by the 
population. In the first place, it's absolutely new for us. People are 
unwilling to have sex discussed in public and don't like attending 
meetings where this is done. Very few people go to such meetings 
W>luntarily, only if they are forced to. When women go, they often 
· Continued on page 20 
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Highlights froin LBH report on hu1nan rights 
The 1981 Report on . the State of Human Rights in Indonesia, published by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), appeared recently after 
unavoidable delays. This is the third in LBH's series of annual reports, and provides important reference material, a chronology and 
detailed case histories of five industrial disputes that occurred in 1981. 
We reproduce below some highlights from the Report. Readers wishing to have copies should write to the LBH (Jalan Diponegoro, 74 
Jakarta Pusat) or await information about an English translation which, we understand, is now in preparation. 
**In his preface, Adnan Buyung Nasution, chairman of the LBH 
Foundation, warns that "a.n accommodating tendency on the part 
of the perpetrators of human rights is becoming part of a grander 
strategy to preser\;'e or perpetuate today's social distortions . We 
must therefore be very careful how we use the term basic human 
rights." As an example Nasution mentions the new Procedural 
Code (KUHAP) which introduces many improvements yet 
perpetuates the Anti-Subversive Law which completely 
disregards human rights. 
** The editors, Mulya Lubis and Fauzi Abdullah, state in their 
Introduction that conditions are basically the same as in the 
previous year, when they were described as "heavily overcast". 
They welcome the fact; however, that the space still exists for 
them to write and publish this Report. "Small as it is, we can at 
least use this valuable space to record developments .... " 
* * Chapter Three provides an analysis of the relationship between 
authoritarianism aµd the current style of economic development: 
The (present) economic policy requires a centralist political power so 
that decision-making can be centralised for the purposes of security 
and efficiency. It needs an executive and bureaucratic apparatus that 
is, politically, relatively homogenous so that political disturbances can 
be kept to a minimum. It needs a long period of time to realise 
systematic change in the economy, with the result that efforts to 
preserve power relations become an integral part of the planned 
economic transformation. It also needs ... 'political stability' so that 
only very limited political action can be tolerated . But the power-
holders need political· legitimacy from the people to continue their 
policy and obtain support from (the West) . The middle-road taken-
if indeed it can be called a middle-road - is that of obliterating 
political centers that have potential to become strong ... while on the 
other hand creating and preserving tightly-controlled channels of 
communication through which to organise mass mobilisation when the 
need arises. This is done to impress external forces that democracy 
exists and at the same time provide strong safeguards to ensure that 
those in power cannot be undermined from below 
The chapter then provides examples of efforts made by small, 
organised groups to break out .of these constraints, but with no 
long-standing results . It describes 1981 as "the darkest period so 
far in the history of political party life in Indonesia". 
** In view of the current wave of organised terror and extra-
judicial murders now under way in Indonesia, under the guise of 
fighting crime (see pages 1-5) the Report's comments about the 
rising level of crime as a sign of growing social dissatisfaction and 
spreading feelings of contempt for the law, are particularly 
apposite. 
Many feel that justifiable material improvements are receding farther 
and farther whilst human rights abuses get worse, the forms of power 
become more exploitative, and the gap between excessive affluence 
and poverty widens. 
** Reporting on political imprisonment, it refers to cases of 
political disappearances leading to political, or extra-judicial, 
executions which have occurred in relation to the persecution and 
arrest of Muslims following the 1981 hijack. Details of these 
disappearances are not given in the Report, but they have been 
mentioned in TAPOL Bulletin reports (see Nos. 52 and 55) (This 
is the first time that LBH has referred publicly to disappearances 
and extra-judicial killings.) 
* * The Report refers in several places to conditions in West Papm1 
and East Timor, conveying a sense of frustration over extreme 
difficulties in obtaining factual information. The Report for the 
first time includes a section on East Timor which deals with 
reported famine, the problem of family re-unification, and the 
report submitting to the central government in 1981 by members 
of the East Tim or Provincial Assembly. 
* * The chapter on education provides a wealth of useful 
information about the lack of facilities, the number of children 
who fail to complete elementary education and the num'ber who 
never go to school at all . It makes a strong p@int about gross 
inequalities resulting from the impoverished backgrounds of such 
a high percentage of children at school. 
** 1981 is described as a "disaster year" for academic life in 
Indonesia. Some of the facts given to support this are: 
- at the Bandung Institute of Technology almost a hundred 
warnings of expulsion and suspension were issued, with nearly ten 
actual expulsions and a smaller number of suspensions; 
- the Indonesian Academy of Sciences, (UPI) 1981 Congress 
was forced to withdraw invitations to a number of well-known 
speakers because of a government ban. In fact, the sessions of the 
Congress were declared 'off the record' by the authorities, 
meaning they could not be publicly reported. UPI sources 
complain of surveillance of their activities over a long period of 
time. They are required to accept the presence of 'security 
officers' even at internal meetings. This, writes the Report, "is the 
first time the government has legally interfered in UPI activities, 
a dangerous precedent"; 
- the expulsion of students at University of Indonesia who 
convened a meeting that was addressed by the writer Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer; (The Report also contains a full account elsewhere 
of the banning and burning of Pramoedya's two Bum novels.) 
- numerous occasions on which students and lecturers have 
been prevented from going abroad to attend academic 
conferences. On one occasion, a student who was going to Japan 
after winning an essay competition was forced off the plane just as 
he was about to leave; 
- the ban on former student activists obtaining lecturerships or 
jobs in government service; 
- a particularly brutal example of organised terror against a 
secondary school in North Aceh after some pupils had 
participated in demonstrations in November 1981. The 
headmaster and several teachers were arrested and called to · 
account. Children were dragged from their classrooms, beaten, 
kicked and tortured. A very large number of them required 
hospital treatment, and the headmaster was badly beaten about 
the face with a rifle, kicked and mal-treated in other ways. 
Altogether two hundred pupils and teachers were subsequently 
taken to another region in North Aceh where they were subjected 
to the most appalling torture, forced to crawl on their knees and to 
grovel naked on the ground. Many spent weeks in hospital with 
broken limbs, concussion and broken ribs. 
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Guest Column ugal was undergoing domestic upheavals . . 
Red light for PNG and Pacific 
It is no secret that in 1973, Indonesia 
changed the name Irian Barat (West Irian) 
to Irian Jaya (Great Irian), as it was desir~d 
that there be only one Irian, and the desig-
nations East and West- after the examples 
of North and South Vietnam, East and 
West Germany, North and South Korea-
were not to be used. The 'Jaya' after 'Irian' 
was to suggest that the time would come 
when the whole island would fall under 
Indonesian jurisdiction. If the military 
regime in Indonesia wishes to follow Su-
karno's example, then the "Eka Komando 
Rakyat" will probably sound something 
like "Invade and occupy". The matter now 
becomes even clearer: if West PNG/ 
Irian Jaya is to be split into three pro-
vinces, which automatically become three 
Military Commands, and because it is 
customary in Indonesia for each province 
to have one army division, then the next 
target for military expansion in Indonesia 
after East Timor can be predicted even 
now. The time will come when the world 
will be shocked by the news that Indonesia 
has invaded eastwards from West PNG/ 
Irian Jaya. Australia and New Zealand will 
do nothing to protect the South Pacific, for 
two reasons. Firstly, both countries are in-
habited by Europeans who came exploring 
and then settled a continent and island situ-
ated within the Asian sphere of influence, 
and who are obliged to seek protection. 
These people see Indonesia as continuing 
to function as a bulwark for them. Secondly, 
it profits their economy more to maintain 
friendly relations with 150 million people in 
Indonesia than with about 5 million in the 
South Pacific, in the same way that the 
Dutch gave up West PNG/lrian Jaya be-
cause of their interests in Indonesia. There 
is a kind of standing joke in Indonesia, 
which says that it was in fact Indonesians 
who first discovered the Australian conti-
nent, before the advent of the Europeans, 
because the name 'Australia' is derived 
from Moluccan dialect, "Ose tara lia". 
The Republic of Indonesia is currently 
planning to split West PNG/Irian Jaya into 
three provinces. Bearing in mind that West 
PNG/lrian Jaya is 31/2 times the size of Java 
and Madura, the plan is understandable. 
The number of inhabitants will be increas-
ed by bringing in more from outside - in 
other words by resettling people from Java, 
Madura and Bali. It is estimated that the 
population of West PNG/lrian Jaya will 
reach 10-15 million by the year 2000, since 
Indonesia will continue to concern itself 
with and oversee the growth of population 
in PNG and the Pacific in general, in an at-
tempt to establish a ratio of 3: 1 (ie. three in 
West PNG/Irian Jaya to one in PNG and 
other Pacific areas). 
This division into three provinces will 
entail the introduction of three "Komando 
Daerah Militer" (Military Commands), 
which will in tum mean the installation of 
three army divisions. The main idea is not 
just to crush any local freedom movements: 
it is part of a planned political and military 
expansion into PNG and the Pacific in 
general. Reliable sources have indicated 
that by 1980, Indonesia had already planted 
some 3,000 spies throughout the Pacific, 
including PNG. 
The "Wawasan Nusantara" policy cur-
rently being implemented by the military 
regime in Indonesia brings to mind the 
ideals of the late President Sukarno: that 
Indonesia must gain control of the area 
from Madagascar to Hawaii, in accordance 
with the PALAPA oath of Gajah Mada, a 
prime minister in the Mojopahit kingdom 
of old. This ideal is still cherished in the 
heart of every Javanese, and the Javanese 
firmly believe that it will, sooner or later, 
be attained. The resettlement of people 
from Java, Madura and Bali on other is-
lands, including West PNG/Irian Jaya, is 
intended to further that cause because 
Indonesians outside of Java are held in 
suspicion, ie. not trusted to provide full 
support. It is well known that nearly all 
regions of Indonesia have risen at some 
time or another to liberate themselves from 
the Republic of Indonesia, which is domi-
nated by the Javanese. These include the 
RMS in the South Moluccas, PARAKU in 
Borneo, PRRI in Sumatra, PERMEST A in 
the North Celebes, Dl/TII in the South 
Celebes and West Java, FPM/OPM in West 
PNG/lrian Jaya, and the Republic of Aceh 
in North Sumatra, which proclaimed its 
independence for the second time on 4th 
November 1976. All these freedom move-
ments would appear to have been wiped 
out by the military, but underground move-
ments are still thriving. Repression and 
eradication of freedom movements by mili-
tary force is not the only effective method 
adopted by the Indonesian government. 
There is also the current method of "smil-
ing policy", involving the resettlement on 
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other islands of people from Java, Madura 
and Bali, with the following objectives: 
1. To disseminate Javanese culture to 
other islands in Indonesia. 
2. To occupy and gain control of fertile 
lands outside Java for the cultivation of 
foodstuffs, especially rice, not only for 
domestic consumption but also for use 
as a military supply in the event of an 
emergency war situation. 
3. To remain alert to and spy on separatist 
movements outside Java. 
4. Resettled people would at the same 
time form potential reserve forces out-
side Java in the event of a general mo-
bilisation in a war situation or wartime 
emergency, with war in the sense of a 
war of territorial expansion, and nothing 
else. 
The 'Tri', 'Dwi' and 'Eka' Commands 
The Republic of Indonesia once issued the 
"TriKomando Rakyat" (the Triple People's 
Command) to seize control of Dutch New 
Guinea from Holland in 1961. With the 
"Dwi Komando Rakyat" (the Double 
People's Command) in 1964, Indonesia 
attempted to do the same with North Bor-
neo, a former British colony, but failed. 
One more "Komando Rakyat" has yet to 
be issued, ie. "Eka Komando Rakyat" (the 
Single People's Command). It was original-
ly thought that this would be used to gain 
control of East Tim or, a former Portuguese 
colony, but events proved otherwise: Indo-
nesia quietly invaded and occupied East 
Timor on 7th December, 1975 - the same 
day on which the American president Ger-
ald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger left Indonesia to return to their 
own country. It was quite clear that the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor was 
masterminded by the US as a reward to 
Indonesia, which had engineered the form-
ation of ASEAN to replace the old SEA TO, 
once the US had withdrawn from Vietnam. 
PNG was Indonesia's first target before 
East Timor, but Indonesia exploited the 
opportunity occurring at a time when Port-
Whatever happens next, the responsi-
bility must lie with those countries which 
are members of Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia (IGGI), because they 
are indirectly assisting Indonesia in imple-
menting its political and military expansion. 
E.J. Bonay, former Indonesian Governor of 
West Irian 
A troopship with several thousand troops arrives in Jayapura harbour, June 3, 1983 
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Film and book review 
~he Y~ar of Living Dangerously , an MGM 
film directed by Peter Weir , based on a 
book of the same name by C.J . Koch , pub-
lished by Sphere Books (London) , 1983. 
(First published in 1978.) 
Fiction and the film can always be expected 
to reach a far wider audience than books 
providing political analysis or campaign 
publications like T APOL Bulletin. Decisive 
events in the modern history of some coun-
tries have been powerfully and persuasively 
portrayed in such films as Pontecorvo's 
"Battle of Algiers" and Costa Gavros' 
"Missing". These . are films that have in-
formed a very large number of people about 
the scheming brutality of French col-
onialism in Algeria and the sinister involve-
ment of Washington in the overthrow of Al-
lende in Chile. 
"The Year of Living Dangerously" takes 
as its piece of history the events leading up 
to the G30S, the 30th September affair in 
Jakarta, 1965, an event that was to place In-
donesia under absolute military rule as hun-
dreds of thousands were murdered and hun-
dreds of thousands more were thrown into 
prison, many for a decade or more. Search 
as you may, though, for a glimmer of under-
standing as to how this really happened, but 
you will find nothing to enlighten you ex-
cept for a re-hash of the myths that have be-
come the official version propagated by the 
Suharto regime. Indeed, one wonders why 
the film had to be shot in Manila, unless the 
Suharto government would have baulked at 
scenes of Jakarta street demonstrations . 
There is not the slightest hint of the extent 
to which the army had already, well before 
the G30S, usurped political and military 
power. The forces of evil driving the coun-
try to ruin are the communists (Nasakom is 
not mentioned) mobbing foreign embassies 
- armed with firearms , mind you - and ter-
rorising foreign journalists, and Sukarno 
betraying his Marhaen, populist principles 
as he grovels in debauchery and cm:ruption. 
derson , the man who "discovers" that the 
Chinese have dispatched a shipload of 
weapons to arm the PKI in preparation for 
their takeover. Many of the wayang allu-
sions are surely too subtle and esoteric to hit 
most people who see the film . Indeed one 
has to read the book on which the film is 
based to appreciate the extent to which 
''The Year of Living Dangerously" is in-
tended to be a westerner's version of the 
Javanese shadow-play. 
But what does come across clearly is the 
film 's portrayal of the 1965 affair , presented 
as a PKI attempt at insurrection , backed 
with those mythical arms from China . The 
only forces said to be opposing the PKI's 
rise to power are "Muslims" . Then, when 
the G30S is crushed, the victors are de-
scribed as "Muslim generals" . Suharto gets 
not a mention in the film , though in the 
book , we discover that Suharto is the man 
the British favour , a "good chap" and a 
"cool customer" , according to Colonel 
Henderson. Henderson himself is pretty 
"cool" for in the film version, he appears as 
the man who, dressed in kilt, encircles the 
British embassy building playing the bag-
pipes as (communist) mobs besiege and de-
stroy it, a neat contrast of western culture 
and oriental violence . 
Woven into Hamilton's romance with 
Jill is the fact that she tells him of the 
Chinese cargo just about to reach a secret 
destination which unintentionally spurs him 
to get his greatest scoop, even at the risk of 
threatening their affair . It also secures 
Hamilton a place on the PKI's "death list" 
because , as it turns out , his Indonesian as-
sistance, Kumar , is a PKI agent , a cold , hol-
low creature whose only expression of polit-
ical faith is his conviction that the ends jus-
tify the means , or in other words , the (PKI-
planned) G30S killings are justified by the 
poverty and oppression of the Indonesian 
people. Kumar is allowed a spark of human-
ity however for he informs Hamilton that 
his life is in danger "if we win" . F,alse re-
ports about PKI "death lists" were in fact 
deliberately started by the military as a jus-
tification for their own killing of hundreds 
of thousands of people in 1965 and 1966. 
Side by side with the distortions and half-
truths about the G30S is an essentially racist 
portrait of Indonesians. For the most part , 
they appear as nothing more than shadows 
lurking, in most cases menacingly, in the 
background , while Anglo-Saxons dominate 
the screen. Those who do appear in more 
coherent form are a pretty despicable lot. 
For women, we have Tiger Lily, Hamilton's 
other assistant , so sinister-looking in the 
flesh that she appears in his dreams as the 
would-be PKI assassin; or a gang of scream-
ing prostitutes who mob Hamilton and -
friend as they drive to a cemetery on the 
outskirts of Jakarta for a "night of plea-
sure" ; or Ibu , the personification of In-
Continued on next page 
The special twist of this westerner's view 
of contemporary Indonesian history is that 
it presumes to penetrate the depths of the 
Javanese soul as depicted in the wayang. 
The central figure, Billy Kwan, is a 
Chinese-Australian dwarf whose patron-
saint is Semar, the god-incarnate , the wise 
and popular wayang figure, advising and re-
monstrating with the good but wayward Ar-
juna, a prince, personified here as Guy 
Hamilton, a successful, British-born Au-
stralian journalist, a good, clean man of in-
tegrity and a cut above the other news hacks 
who share gossip in the Hotel Indonesia's 
Wayang Bar. He falls in love with Jill 
Bryant; Billy brings them together like a 
dalang or wayang puppeteer because his 
own love for both of them cannot be con-
summated. She is the princess, Srikandi, to 
Hamiton's Arjuna, but what is more impor-
tant to the plot is that she is a British em-
bassy official, special assistant to the British 
military intelligence officer, Colonel Hen- Linda Hunt as cameraman Billy Kwan and Nel Gibson as Guy Hamilton. 
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Continued from page 16 rupiahs. If you can't afford that , you don't get treated. 
Outside Dili, in the Pastes, there's little to be had in the way of 
medical treatment, but people there are not allowed to go to Dili 
for treatment . The result is that people often die for lack of 
treatment . In any case, treatment in the hospitals and clinics is 
very unsatisfactory, given without care or attention; it's such a 
contrast to Portuguese times when hospitals were well-staffed and 
treatment was qualified and good. Some of the Indonesian 
doctors are poorly qualified. Others are well qualified, but they 
only want to treat people properly in their private practices, and 
for high fees. 
face rows with the family when they return home. According to 
the government , the ideal size of a family is three children, but 
you know , Timorese families are by tradition very large, on an 
average ten children, and they deeply resent being told to have 
small families . But this idea of having only three children is 
hammered in all the time. I can assure you that the women who 
get the Depo Provera injections don't know what it is for. And I 
know that there are cases of women being sterilised without their 
consent . I know the case of a woman , Mrs . Galhas , who went to 
hospital to have an appendix removed , but while she was under 
anaesthetic, the doctor also tied up her fallopian tubes without her 
consent. The point is that she already had ten children and the 
authorities apparently decided that she should be sterilised. 
What about medical treatment. What are the hospitals and clinics 
like? 
Clinics have indeed been set up; they're called puskesmas 
(social health centres), but there's very little in the way of 
medicine . When people go to the puskesmas in the Pastes , they'll 
be lucky to get a few pills. For more serious complaints requiring 
hospital treatment, the only way is to pay for it. This can be as 
much as 60,000 to 80,000 rupiahs, or even as much as 100,000 
The birth control programme, you know, is part of a stratagem 
being pursued by the Indonesians. Before the invasion, under the 
Portuguese, there was never any attempt to force such things on 
people; people could have as many children as they wanted. In 
those days, the population was about 650,000, and considering the 
size of the country, it was far from being over-populated. Now, 
after at least 200,000 people have been killed off during the war, 
any talk of over-population is even more ludicrous. There's 
absolutely no need for any family planning. On the contrary. But 
it's quite clear that the reason why the Indonesians are resorting to 
this kind of thing is because they want to kill off the Timorese, and 
to re-populate our country with their own people. 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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Continued from page 19 
donesia's poor, befriended by the dwarf, 
who is too stupid to realise that the canal 
water she uses to bathe her child is polluted 
enough to kill him. For men, in addition to 
the creepy Kumar, we have a constantly 
petrified chauffeur, a lot of grim-looking 
troops who keep blocking Hamilton in his 
search for news, and servants who pad 
about in the bars and homes of westerners. 
No wonder the dwarf so strongly believes 
that only "Anglo-Saxons are good in the 
tropics" . 
Just in case the fact of political murder is 
overlooked, there is a scene right at the end 
showing a line of (communist?) men and 
women being shot dead by the military. 
But , having been told all along that com-
munists have no regard for life, we can 
hardly be expected to sympathise with 
them. 
20 
One could deal at some length with the 
numerous historical inaccuracies. There 
was ,_ for instance, no curfew in Jakarta in 
1965 until after 1st October though the wes-
terners keep referring to one throughout 
the film; Hamilton and Jill even crush 
through a curfew blockade, and get shot at 
for good measure. Nor did street de-
monstrators wear red head-bands, a tradi-
tion from the 1940s, not the 1960s; the red-
ness, though, did help reinforce the impres-
sion of communist presence. But the main 
trouble with a film or book like this is that 
they come across as skilfully-written, well-
produced and competently-acted works of 
"faction", leading the uninformed viewer or 
reader to believe that this is what really hap-
pened in Indonesia in 1965. It's a tragedy 
that the first novel and film to depict that 
period should have been done with such dis-
regard for the truth. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
This and other cartoons 
from INDOC, Leiden 
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T APOL welcomes letters from read-
ers and hopes to continue its series of 
Guest Column articles. Signed art-
icles do not necessarily express views 
with which TAPOL can agree; they 
are published in order to promote 
discussion of issues relevant to devel-
opments in Indonesia today. 
Readers' letters must be kept 
reasonably short, otherwise cuts will 
have to be made because space is 
limited. 
All letters should be related to 
human rights problems with which 
TAPOL is concerned. 
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